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ExEcutivE summary
Energiewende – Germany’s long-term strategic policy project 
Initiated in May 2011, several months after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, 
Germany’s energy transformation (Energiewende) has been presented as an ir-
revocable plan, and – due to the speed of change required – it represents a new 
quality in Germany’s energy strategy. Its main objectives include: nuclear en-
ergy being phased out by 2022, the development of renewable energy sources, 
the expansion of transmission networks, the construction of new conventional 
power plants and an improvement in energy efficiency. The cornerstone of the 
strategy is the development of renewable energy. Under Germany’s amended 
renewable energy law, the proportion of renewable energy in electricity gen-
eration is supposed to increase steadily from the current level of around 20% to 
approximately 38% in 2020. In 2030, renewable energy is expected to account 
for 50% of electricity generation. This is expected to increase to 65% in 2040 
and to as much as 80% in 2050. 
The impact of the Energiewende is not limited to the sphere of energy supplies. 
In the medium and long term, it will change not only to the way the German 
economy operates, but also the functioning of German society and the state. 
Facing difficulties with the expansion of transmission networks, the excessive 
cost of building wind farms, and problems with the stability of electricity sup-
plies, especially during particularly cold winters, the federal government has 
so far tended to centralise power and limit the independence of the German 
federal states with regard to their respective energy policies, justifying this 
with the need for greater co-ordination. The Energiewende may also become the 
beginning of a “third industrial revolution”, i.e. a transition to a green econo-
my and a society based on sustainable development. This will require a new 
“social contract” that will redefine the relations between the state, society and 
the economy. Negotiating such a contract will be one of the greatest challenges 
for German policy in the coming years.
Being the most ambitious project of the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition, the Ener-
giewende seems to be “doomed to succeed”, if only because there is no official 
scenario or plan B that would allow the government to withdraw from it if its 
implementation were to encounter serious difficulties. the Energiewende has 
been, alongside the eurozone crisis, one of the major topics of the cam-
paign ahead of the Bundestag elections scheduled for september 2013. it is 
therefore linked to chancellor angela merkel’s political credibility. 
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Energiewende – chaos management
Even though the Energiewende is in line with the objectives of Germany’s cli-
mate and energy policy defined back in 2002 by the SPD and Green coalition, 
its implementation has run into various obstacles.
One of the main problems with the Energiewende concerns financing. The larg-
est share of the cost of subsidising the renewable energy sector is borne direct-
ly by individual end consumers and those companies which are not exempted 
from the electricity bill surcharge imposed to finance the development of re-
newable energy. The surcharge has been the fastest-growing component of 
electricity bills in Germany. In 2011, it was 3.53 cents per 1 KWh, with 1 KWh of 
electricity costing 25.2 cents on average, i.e. the surcharge accounted for 13.9% 
of the price of 1 KWh of electricity, compared to just 5.1% in 2008. 
Moreover, social protests have been affecting the speed at which some infra-
structural undertakings have been implemented, especially the expansion 
of transmission networks. Despite public support for the Energiewende, a le-
gal problem has emerged, which is well summed up by the NIMBY (Not In My 
Back Yard) acronym, or another term: the BANANA Syndrome (Build Abso-
lutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anything). The implementation of the trans-
formation plans therefore hinges on how the federal, state, and local authori-
ties regulate the involvement of the public. So far, only around 200 km of new 
transmission networks have been built, out of the nearly 4,000 km necessary.
the change in Germany’s energy strategy was not preceded by any con-
sultations with its European partners and has thus created numerous 
challenges for Germany’s neighbours whose own project (e.g. to build nu-
clear power plants) suddenly became contestable, or whose transmission net-
works started to be used for stepped up transmission of electricity from wind 
farms, thus undermining their stability and increasing the risk of blackouts.
Energiewende as a driving force of the German economy
The Energiewende is expected to prevent job losses or even to create new 
jobs in Germany. Based on a comparison of employment figures in the energy 
sector and in other sectors of the German economy, the energy sector can be 
classified as one of the top-ten employers in Germany. The entire sector em-
ployed around 600,000 people in 2009, with conventional energy accounting 
for around 39% of this figure. The number of employees in the unconventional 
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energy sector is not very high in comparison with the other leading sectors, 
but its growth rate suggests that it will in future become an important part of 
the German economy. According to estimates from the Environment Ministry, 
employment in this sector will increase to 500,000–600,000 in 2030. This will, 
however, go hand in hand with the decline of conventional energy companies. 
It is, therefore, difficult to assess whether the overall number of jobs will actu-
ally rise. 
Renewable energy technologies are one of the fastest growing categories 
of exports. The exact rate of this growth is, however, difficult to assess since 
no up-to-date figures on growth dynamics are available. In 2007, Germany 
exported nearly 9 billion euros worth of renewable electricity installations. 
Wind farm components accounted for 85% of this volume. Germany expects 
that exports of this technology in particular may become a German special-
ity because of the country’s traditional competitive advantage in the machine-
building sector. 45% of exports were sold to Europe, 26% to Asia and 25% to the 
United States. 
Energiewende as a new dimension in Germany’s foreign policy 
There are several reasons why the Energiewende should be treated as a well-
considered strategy rather than an ad hoc tactic of the German government. 
Firstly, the decision to go ahead with the transformation ended the “nuclear” 
dispute which had been forging deep divisions in German society for decades. 
Secondly, Germany believes that the Energiewende will allow it to escape from 
dependence on conventional energy resources. Finally, it is believed that in-
vestments related to the Energiewende will enable Germany to maintain its 
high position in international trade as a green technology exporter. 
implementing the German energy transformation model or at least 
some of its elements throughout the European union could make the 
Energiewende more profitable and provide a boost for Germany’s green tech-
nology exports. Extending the transmission networks and cross-border inter-
connections in the EU could also reduce the cost. German’s policy will there-
fore aim at building a coalition of states as broad as is possible. The country’s 
new environment minister Peter Altmaier has coined a name for this “Klub 
der Energiewendestaaten” (a club of states supporting the energy transforma-
tion). It would include a vanguard of states willing to implement energy trans-
formation in their respective countries and to prove by this that switching to 
renewable energy offers economic opportunities since economic growth and 
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protection of the climate are not contradictory objectives but rather two sides 
of the same coin. 
Raising the binding targets for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in the 
EU and the ensuing increase of prices for emissions allowances would also be 
helpful for Germany’s transformation. An expanded budget of the Energy-
Climate fund, which will receive the total revenue from Germany’s additional 
CO2 emissions allowances, is supposed to be the most important new source of 
funding for the Energiewende.
After Europeanisation, the next step to make the Energiewende a reality should 
consist, according to Germany, in making the project international since 
the dual task of protecting the climate and ensuring durable energy security 
requires a global approach. As with Europeanisation, a global approach would 
aim to make the use of renewable energy sources more widespread, to enhance 
the market competitiveness of renewable energy technologies worldwide, to 
actively support the phasing out of other energy sources (especially nuclear 
and coal), and to invest in gas as the best transitional fossil energy source ca-
pable of supporting the development of renewable energy. 
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introduction
In May 2011, several months after the nuclear power plant disaster in Fuku-
shima, the German government took the long and anxiously awaited decision 
to phase out Germany’s nuclear power plants to 2022 and to switch the German 
economy to renewable energy sources. However, instead of creating a solid 
basis for new policy, propped up by confidence from society and the private 
sector, the decision created enormous chaos and uncertainty, not only in Ger-
many, but also in Europe. Launched in the summer of 2011, the Energiewende 
is still subject to debate concerning not only the future energy model, but also 
Germany’s social and economic models. This debate is being followed closely 
across Europe because should the Energiewende project succeed in Germany, it 
will provide a basis for similar solutions in other countries.
The revolutionary speed at which the German economy is switching to re-
newable energy is proving to be an unusually difficult and costly challenge. 
The amendments introduced to a number of laws (from the nuclear law to 
the renewable energy law and the laws regulating the necessary extensions 
of energy grids) under time pressure and also under pressure from public 
opinion, are at present regarded as being insufficient. Therefore, works are in 
progress to further improve them. Implementation of the new strategy’s key 
objectives – such as the extension of transmission grids and the construction 
of new conventional power plants – has been stumbling on growing economic 
and legal obstacles. The development of the green technology sector has also 
caused problems – its solar energy sector has been over-subsidised, while the 
offshore wind farm sector has on the other hand been under-subsidised. The 
strategy’s success may also be undermined by the absence of comprehensive 
co-ordination and the financial burden that its implementation is imposing on 
society and the economy. Electricity prices have been rising, and the listings 
of the largest energy companies, including E.ON and RWE, plummeted imme-
diately after the German government announced the Energiewende decisions. 
The companies were forced to change their long-term investment strategies 
wholesale. The German chancellor has yet to persuade experts, businesses and 
voters that “the energy U-turn is a huge opportunity” and that the process will 
go ahead only if “security of supplies, climate protection and its economic vi-
ability are ensured”. German business associations have been and still are cau-
tioning against a politically motivated, ill-considered and irreversible phasing 
out of nuclear energy. They are concerned about high electricity costs (and es-
pecially the unfair sharing of that burden), the instability of supplies, as well 
as the negative impact on the environment.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
10
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
03
/2
01
3
The decisions of the spring and summer of 2011 were no doubt taken in a highly 
strung atmosphere. The Fukushima nuclear disaster triggered panic among 
the German public, and that brought forward the decision to phase out nuclear 
energy. That decision had not been preceded by consultations with Germany’s 
EU neighbours and partners, or even by any reliable calculations at the fed-
eral level or an analysis of the short, medium and long-term consequences of 
the step for the German economy and the country’s position. The ongoing cam-
paign before the Baden-Württemberg elections, crucial for the German Chris-
tian Democrats, also played an important role, as the Chancellor’s decision had 
the potential of winning over a section of the Green party’s voters. 
However, emotions were not the only factor. The Energiewende certainly de-
serves to be treated as a strategic, long-term project in German policy. Firstly, 
the idea to implement a gradual shift towards a lead role for renewable energy 
was first conceived some time before the Energiewende project was announced. 
The decision to shut down nuclear power plants was a factor in the acceleration 
of the process, as nuclear energy had been the transition technology of choice 
in the original plan. Secondly, the decision to go ahead with the Energiewende 
ended the dispute over nuclear energy which had been going on for decades 
and which had created deep divisions in German society. Thirdly, Germans 
believe that the Energiewende will enable them to escape from their depend-
ence on conventional energy resources (including gas imported from Russia). 
Finally, they also believe that investments related to the Energiewende will en-
able Germany to maintain its high position in international trade (as a leader 
in green technology), adding to the country’s strong standing in traditional in-
dustry sectors. 
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i. tHE sociaL and PoLiticaL contExt
1.  the federal government’s position
In the coalition agreement concluded back in 2009, the Christian Democrats 
and the Liberals unanimously decided that Germany’s nuclear power plants 
should remain in operation. Therefore, the sudden change of attitude towards 
nuclear energy on the part of cabinet members representing the two parties 
came as a surprise. It turned out that the formulation of a joint position did 
not even require long negotiations. Horst Seehofer, the deputy leader of the 
CSU and the prime minister of Bavaria, who used to be one of the most vocal 
advocates of nuclear energy, changed his mind and adopted the opposite view 
almost overnight; which surprised even some members of his own party. Poli-
ticians of the liberal FDP, who had previously argued that nuclear power plants 
should remain in operation, behaved in a similar fashion. Their stance could 
have been influenced by the fact that during the government debate that pre-
ceded the announcement of the nuclear phase out, the Liberals had managed to 
push through several demands that were important for them. These included: 
keeping at least one of the existing nuclear power plants in operation as a “cold 
reserve” to ensure energy supply during particularly cold winters, keeping 
in place the tax on nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants, and increasing the 
budget for subsidies for the thermal insulation of buildings to 1.5 billion euros 
a year1. The FDP considers the Energiewende to be a great challenge, but also 
an inevitable process. It also believes that the Energiewende offers an opportu-
nity to ensure a stable energy supply for future generations. The Liberals also 
advocate increased investment in new coal and gas fired power plants. Those 
proposals are in line with the direction of the energy transformation outlined 
by Chancellor Merkel. The fact that the initial decision for a moratorium on the 
operation of nuclear power plants for three months, taken almost immediately 
following the Fukushima disaster, was jointly announced by Merkel and Guido 
Westerwelle, the then deputy chancellor and the leader of the Liberals, further 
demonstrated that there was consensus on the issue within the cabinet. 
Consequently, the Energiewende became a priority undertaking for the CDU/CSU/
FDP coalition and one of the few reforms on which there is relative consensus in 
the ruling coalition. The coalition members are aware that the Energiewende is 
a process that will be spread over many years, and that they will not be able to 
1 http://www.liberale.de/Ohne-Netzausbau-keine-Versorgungssicherheit/7719c12762i3p69/
index.html
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present any tangible results during the campaign for the elections to the Bunde-
stag in 2013. In order to ensure re-election and to maintain voter confidence, the 
Christian Democrats and the Liberals must convince the public that the decision to 
radically change the country’s energy strategy was right and that it is slowly start-
ing to bear fruit. Because of the hasty launch of the Energiewende by Chancellor 
Merkel with almost unanimous support from her coalition partners in the spring 
of 2011, the new energy strategy is not only a priority for the federal government 
- it is also a project that cannot be allowed to fail. The chancellor justified the deci-
sion to close down all nuclear power plants by 2022 by saying that “it is not pos-
sible to simply come to terms” with the Fukushima nuclear disaster2. This played 
well not only with the public mood3, but also with expert recommendations4. The 
implementation schedule for the Energiewende is extremely tight and many have 
been warning that 2022 is unrealistically ambitious for a complete phasing out of 
all reactors and the achievement of a considerable increase of the share of renewa-
ble energy in Germany’s general energy mix5. Moreover, Germans see themselves 
as the forerunners of a new energy concept for the European Union and the world, 
based on the phasing out of nuclear energy and a gradual switching of the energy 
system to power from renewable sources6. As the single most ambitious project 
of the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition, the energy transformation seems to be “doomed 
to succeed”, if only because there is no official scenario to withdraw from the 
Energiewende, even if the project stumbles on very serious difficulties (e.g. prob-
lems extending the transmission networks, too high costs of wind farm develop-
ment, or problems with energy supplies during particularly cold winters). 
Germany’s energy policy spans various areas of state and business activity 
which fall within the remits of different ministries. Before the Energiewende 
was announced, this was not a problem because the competences of different 
ministries seldom overlapped. However, with an undertaking on the scale of 
the Energiewende, which requires the simultaneous involvement of several 
2 http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Service/Mediathek/Videos/videos_
node.html?id=139490
3 80% of respondents in a survey by the Forsa Institute in March 2011 declared they were 
wary of nuclear energy in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, and 63% were in favour 
of shutting down reactors in Germany either immediately or within the next two years.
4 For example those presented by the Ethics Commission established by the Chancellor, 
which is composed of seventeen members including scientists, members of the clergy, busi-
ness people, politicians and representatives of trade unions.
5 For example: http://www.spektrum.de/alias/energie/zehn-jahre-reichen-nicht-zum-um-
stieg/1146932
6 http://www.bmu.de/energiewende/fragen_und_antworten/doc/47498.php
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ministries, the unclear division of tasks between the various ministries in 
charge of implementing the Energiewende has created informational chaos and 
confusion with regard to the division of powers and competences. This refers 
in particular to the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of the Environment, 
i.e. the two ministries crucial for the success of the Energiewende. Even though 
the Ministry of the Environment has been playing a lead role since the decision 
to go ahead with the Energiewende was taken, some of the central offices impor-
tant for the implementation of the Energiewende are still overseen by the Min-
istry of Economy, which hitherto has been the principal ministry in charge 
of energy. The German Energy Agency (DENA), in charge of the development 
of renewable energy, energy effectiveness and smart grids, is a case in point. 
Disputes between the ministers for economy and for the environment also con-
tributed to the impression of chaos for some time. The most widely publicised 
clash took place in early 2012 and concerned the plans to reduce the subsidies 
paid to the manufacturers and users of solar batteries, and the rates of co-financ-
ing for building upgrades aimed at improving energy effectiveness. Even though 
the dispute concerned real policy issues, it developed against a background of the 
ambitions and party affiliations of the ministers involved. The ambition of the 
economy minister Philipp Rösler (FDP) was geared towards demonstrating that, 
despite the new division of tasks ensuing from the energy transformation, his 
ministry was still important. The then minister for the environment Norbert 
Röttgen (CDU) had similar ambitions. Moreover, the dispute took place in a pe-
riod when the FDP, of which Rösler is the leader, was experiencing a dramatic 
slump in support levels. It was therefore transformed into his fight for political 
survival as the party leader and an effort to mark the presence of the FDP on the 
German political scene (polls have shown the FDP’s level of support oscillating 
around the 5-percent election threshold for many months and the party has been 
losing most elections to federal state parliaments). 
The diffused responsibility for the Energiewende and the overlapping compe-
tences of ministries have triggered criticism from politicians (including the 
coalition parties), the media, business associations, experts and public opinion. 
It has often been suggested that the optimum solution would be to concentrate 
all tasks related to the Energiewende within one separate ministry for energy7. 
7 See for example: http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/csu-landesgruppen che- 
finhasselfeldt-fordert-energieministerium/5998332.html, http://www.dradio.de/dkultur/
sendungen/interview/1642127/, http://www.wiwo.de/politik/deutschland/energiewende-
wir- brauchen-einen-energieminister/6358504.html
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Chancellor Merkel has ruled out this solution and has started to increasingly 
treat the energy transformation as her own domain, even though the existing 
division of competences still applies formally. 
Chancellor Merkel demonstrated this much in May 2012 when she suddenly re-
placed the minister for the environment. Based on a motion from Merkel, Nor-
bert Röttgen was dismissed and Peter Altmaier nominated as the new minister 
for the environment. The decision came in the aftermath of the lost elections 
in North Rhine-Westphalia where Röttgen was CDU leader. The main reason, 
however, was to speed up the implementation of the Energiewende and improve 
co-ordination of the whole project. In addition, Chancellor Merkel wanted to 
demonstrate that she was taking over co-ordination of the activities that until 
then had been carried out by several ministries and that she had a direct influ-
ence on the way the nuclear phasing out process was being put into practice. 
Peter Altmaier, the former secretary of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in 
the Bundestag, is a loyal and very efficient official without political ambitions 
of his own. This for Merkel is a guarantee that he will treat the Energiewende 
as a priority and follow the Chancellor’s guidelines. The change in personnel 
was also intended to help end the dispute within the coalition between the 
minister for the environment and the minister for economy and technology 
Philipp Rösler about the choice of specific solutions for the Energiewende8. The 
new environment minister, whose appointment brought criticism from vari-
ous political circles (including members of the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition), has 
been gaining recognition ever more successfully, in particular for his skills 
as an efficient mediator and negotiator. His efficacy is visible, for instance, in 
the fact that disputes between his own ministry and the Ministry of Economy 
have been resolved, and successive compromises have been reached in negotia-
tions with the federal states.
On 16 August 2012 Peter Altmaier presented a ten-point plan for the 
Energiewende. The plan sets out proposals which are to serve as guidelines 
for the transformation of Germany’s energy model during the remainder 
of this term of the Bundestag, i.e. until September 2013. It is also the most 
important document outlining the current state of play with regard to the 
8 This concerned in particular the changes to the original model of subsidies for renewable 
energy under the Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz; the underlying causes of the conflict also 
included a dispute over Energiewende-related competences and the fact that both the CDU 
and the FDP were trying to take advantage of it. Cf. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/
deutschland/roettgen-und-roesler-der-streit-der-minister-um-den-oekostrom/6074848.
html (18.09.2012).
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coalition’s plans and intentions. The programme points to the Energiewende 
as the most important “economic and political challenge” since German 
reunification and “the greatest environmental challenge ever”9. The docu-
ment lays down three basic conclusions: (1) it is necessary to slow down 
the development of renewable energies10 and make the process market-
oriented with a view to ultimately adjusting it to the economic needs and 
capacities of Germany; (2) social dialogue is an indispensable element 
of the Energiewende, and (3) Germany’s activities concerning the Ener-
giewende need to become internationalized.
The diagnosis of the first conclusion of the Altmaier plan is that the current 
condition of the transmission infrastructure and the costs of the Ener-
giewende do not match the output of renewable energy. The plan shows that 
green energy production will exceed the initial target of 35% before 2020. 
In order to balance and evenly distribute the energy transformation costs 
Altmaier suggests, inter alia, that private capital should become more in-
volved in reshaping Germany’s energy model11, and warns against placing 
an excessive burden on German industry due to rising energy prices that 
risk undermining its competitiveness. The ministry proposes an accelera-
tion of the transition of the Energiewende towards a market-oriented model 
in the medium term by amending the law that prioritises renewable en-
ergy (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz EEG) and also provides for a system of 
subsidies for renewable energy producers. Once the subsidies are cut, the 
producers will have to adapt to market conditions, which will also drive 
energy prices down. Finally, according to Altmaier, in order for the Ener-
giewende to succeed, transmission networks and storage facilities need to 
be extended, and works need to be undertaken on new technologies for ac-
cumulating energy (e.g. by developing the “Power to Gas” concept). The ef-
forts to extend and develop the existing transmission grids will slow down 
9 Mit neuer Energie, 10 Punkte, für eine Energie- und Umweltpolitik mit Ambition und Au-
genmaß, Arbeitsprogramm des Bundesumweltministeriums für die laufende Legislatur-
periode, p. 6, http://www.bmu.de/strategien_und_bilanzen/doc/49041.php (18.09.2012).
10 Mr Altmaier mentioned it in a conference organised by Handelsblatt, 28.08.2012. Cf. http://
www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/handelsblatt-konferenz-altmaier-will-ener-
giewende-entschleunigen/7066204.html (18.09.2012).
11 One of the proposals is to use funds gathered by the private insurance companies. A re-
port on this subject has been prepared by the federal government’s Research Council for 
Global Climate Change. See: Finanzierung der globalen Energiewende, http://www.wbgu.
de/fileadmin/templates/dateien/veroeffentlichungen/politikpapiere/pp2012-pp7/wbgu_
pp7_dt.pdf (19.09.2012)
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the implementation tempo of the Energiewende because they will face in-
vestment financing and location problems and will require winning the 
citizens’ approval for the planned changes12.
Secondly, the plan also emphasises the need for greater public involve-
ment in the implementation of the Energiewende and better co-ordination 
of the entire project. To this end, the Ministry of the Environment will es-
tablish a new department for fundamental social and political issues and 
citizen participation, in charge of public consultations and co-operation 
with stakeholders at the early stages of project planning. The emphasis 
on stronger social dialogue stems from previous experience, for instance: 
with the Stuttgart 21 project13, the transportation of radioactive waste via 
Germany or the selection of radioactive waste disposal sites.
Altmaier also stresses that financing of the energy transformation should 
be spread over a longer time period so as to avoid excessively burdening 
German citizens with the costs of the Energiewende. One of the specific so-
lutions proposed in the plan provides for free consultancy on improving the 
effectiveness of energy use, due to which households would be able to opti-
mise their electricity spending. The idea of dialogue proposed by Altmaier 
also extends to a co-ordination of the activities of individual federal states 
in order to implement the Energiewende more effectively and efficiently14. 
Altmaier also believes that public involvement will be key to solving is-
sues concerning shale gas extraction, which the ministry considers to be 
controversial, and which may lead to protests in local communities15. The 
feasibility assessment of shale gas extraction through fracking, published 
by the Ministry of the Environment and the Federal Environment Agency, 
12 Cf. http://www.ftd.de/politik/deutschland/:netzausbau-stau-auf-der-stromauto-
bahn/70086878.html (19.09.2012).
13 A project to extend the Stuttgart railway station, which caused huge social protests that 
lasted for several months.
14 The main objective is to lay down renewable energy output targets for individual federal 
states in order to adjust their energy mixes to current economic needs, and to co-ordi-
nate co-operation between the federal administration and federal states in order to avoid 
the duplication of infrastructure projects. Cf. http://www.handelsblatt.com/economy-
business-und-finance-altmaier-will-bei-energiewende-bessere-zusammenarbeit-mit-
laender/7140428.html (20.09.2012).
15 Cf. Mit neuer Energie…, op. cit., p. 18. 
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which the Altmaier report mentions, authorises fracking only if rigorous 
water resource and environmental protection conditions are met16.
Finally, the third conclusion of the Altmaier plan covers the need to interna-
tionalise the Energiewende. If successful, this will consolidate and strength-
en Germany’s global position in the renewable energy sector in coming 
years. The same applies to the development of the individual sectors of the 
energy industry, including in particular the manufacture of photovoltaic 
subassemblies. The plan to create a club of countries supporting renewable 
energy is to be an important step towards internationalising the German 
energy transformation. Apart from promoting the Energiewende, its tasks 
should include, according to Altmaier, supporting economic growth based 
on renewable energy and action taken for protection of the climate. He also 
advocates a greater harmonisation of the international emissions trading 
standards so as to achieve synergies resulting from closer alignment. Fur-
thermore, the plan calls for the debate on the European energy policy to 
be shifted up a gear, especially with regard to emissions trading, for EU 
climate targets to be maintained at 30% and for discussions about the pro-
spective 2050 targets to be launched.
2. the Energiewende’s impact on Germany’s changing social model17
Taken in June 2011, the decision to go ahead with the Energiewende brought one 
of the most important disputes that had divided the society of Germany (West 
Germany before 1990) to an end, i.e. the dispute over nuclear energy. In 2001, 
when the government of the SPD and the Greens decided to phase out nuclear 
power plants, the conservative and liberal opposition objected to the move. Ten 
years later, all political forces are in favour. This agreement reflects the consen-
sus among the general public, which developed as a result of the changes that 
have occurred in the sphere of values since the end of the 1960s. Those changes 
manifested themselves, inter alia, in growing environmental awareness and in 
protests against the construction of nuclear power plants. The Green party was 
established in 1979 as a political consequence of this evolution, and has been 
16 Gemeinsame Pressemitteilung des Bundesumweltministeriums und des Umweltbunde-
samtes: Fracking nur mit strengen Auflagen zulassen, Nr. 118/12, Berlin, 06.09.2012, http://
www.bmu.de/pressemitteilungen/aktuelle_pressemitteilungen/pm/49111.php (19.09.2012).
17 The author of this section, Piotr Buras, prepared this part of the report during his research 
stay at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.
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represented in the Bundestag since 1983. Over time, the environmental ideas 
and aversion to nuclear energy have become mainstream. When the Fukushima 
disaster took place in March 2011, 63% of Germans backed the decision to phase 
out the country’s nuclear power plants over the course of five years. 
Public consent to the phasing out of nuclear power was reflected in the May 
2011 report of the Ethics Commission composed of representatives from various 
political and social groups. The report provided a basis for the government’s 
decision on the Energiewende, which it defined as a common task for society as 
a whole18. A year later, in summer 2012, public support for phasing out nuclear 
energy remained high. According to figures from the Allensbach Institute, 73% 
of respondents consider it to be the right decision, and only 16% believe it was 
a mistake. Support for the Energiewende is linked with political affiliation only 
to a limited extent – 79% of SPD voters back it and 64% of the CDU’s electorate19. 
However, this broad popular support for changes in the energy policy does not 
mean that the implementation of those changes will proceed smoothly. The 
general agreement that nuclear energy should be phased out does not auto-
matically mean that all consequences of the accelerated switch to renewable 
energy, such as for instance its financial consequences, will be easily accepted. 
Only 32% of Germans accept higher energy prices as a result of the changes, 
while 53% are against them. Thus, while the direction of change is not contest-
ed, the specific projects and implementation stages of the Energiewende may 
lead to discontent, or even inspire resistance from the public. Therefore, the 
Energiewende is a challenge not only for the German economy, but also for the 
country’s politics and democracy. 
Implementation of the project requires stronger state intervention in energy 
policy and also a more active role for the state. The task of switching the econ-
omy to renewable energy cannot be left to market forces alone. This refers, 
for instance, to setting the price for electricity in the markets, to subsidies 
and to the rules of the “power markets” where the state will now have to act 
more strongly as a regulator20. This role needs to be strengthened also because 
the changes should be fast, since all nuclear power plants will be decommis-
sioned by 2022. The speed of the planning, preparation and implementation 
18 Deutschlands Energiewende – Ein Gemeinschaftswerk für die Zukunft, Ethik Kommission 
Sichere Energieversorgung, Berlin, den 30. Mai 2011.
19 Renate Köcher, Schwierige Wende, FAZ, 21.06.2012.
20 Cf. Fritz Vorholz, Grieft ein!, Die Zeit, 4.08.2011.
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of investments is of key importance for the government and businesses alike. 
In 2011, a law on the accelerated development of electricity grids was enacted, 
which grants wider competences to the federal government (at the expense of 
the federal states and municipalities). The opponents of the Energiewende and 
the environmental transformations have therefore been cautioning against 
“ecodictatorship”, excessive growth and a centralisation of the state, and 
restric tions on the operation of the free market. 
On the other hand, the initiators of the Energiewende and social organisations 
have been pointing out that in order for the “project of the century” to succeed, 
citizens must be actively involved in its implementation21. First of all, the pub-
lic’s approval must be obtained for the large-scale infrastructural projects nec-
essary for the new energy supply model to function, i.e. especially the 3,800 
kilometres of new high-voltage transmission lines needed to connect the wind 
farms in the north with energy consumers in the south, as well as extensions 
of local electricity grids, new wind farms and energy storage facilities. That is 
because all those projects will entail significant changes to the environment, 
the local landscape and to people’s standard of living. A stronger involvement 
from citizens in the democratic decision-making process with regard to the 
planned undertakings is therefore necessary for practical reasons (protests 
could render the projects impossible to carry through or delay their implemen-
tation), but also for political reasons (to consolidate and strengthen consensus 
on the Energiewende). 
Reconciling the two objectives, i.e. on the one hand strengthening the role of 
the state and implementing infrastructural projects in a timely fashion, and 
ensuring the broader democratic participation needed to legitimise the Ener-
giewende on the other, will be one of the greatest challenges for the federal gov-
ernment. It will require adjustments to the set of instruments offered by the 
German political system, especially with regard to the involvement of citizens 
in decision-making. The Energiewende has thus become the focal point for the 
debate on the future of German democracy. The project is being implemented 
at a time when the representative institutions and the political class are expe-
riencing a crisis of confidence22 and citizens are more and more often becoming 
mobilised against the decisions of the elite. 
21 E.g. the president of the Ethics Commission, Klaus Töpfer.
22 Cf. Serge Embacher, Demokratie! Nein danke?, FES, Berlin 2009.
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2.1. social protests
Infrastructural projects have been the most likely targets of civil protests in 
recent years. The most widely publicised cases included the protests against 
the construction of a new railway station in Stuttgart23, new runways at the 
Frankfurt airport, and the extension of the Munich airport. All three cases 
involved opposition to investments that ran counter to the interests or con-
victions of the local communities, and also encountered problems with pro-
cedural issues, i.e. insufficient information and not enough citizen involve-
ment in the decision-making processes of the projects in question. The word 
Wutbürger (angry citizen) started to be commonly used to describe the emerg-
ing resistance of citizens dissatisfied with decisions taken above their heads. 
Some believe the Wutbürger to be a manifestation of the conservatism typical 
of German society with its aversion to progress and large technological pro-
jects (hence the old objections against nuclear energy, but also against trans-
mission networks for wind power). Others regard it as proof that civil society 
is stirring itself, with people demanding a more direct say in political deci-
sions that until now have been reserved for parliaments and traditional politi-
cal parties; the ACTA agreement, the growing popularity of the Pirate Party or 
consumer movements could all serve as examples of this. Both interpretations 
lead to the conclusion that in order for the Energiewende to succeed, relations 
between politics and the public have to be renegotiated, especially since the 
scale of the necessary investments in transmission networks is on an entirely 
different scale than that of the Stuttgart railway station project, which gripped 
the attention of German public opinion for months.
Projects to extend energy infrastructures gave rise to protests even before 
the Energiewende decision was taken in June 2011. A much-publicised conflict 
took place in Thuringia over a section of the so-called Thuringia Power Bridge 
between Halle and Schweinfurt, which would cross Thuringia Forest. The 
power bridge is intended to transmit wind power from the north of Germany 
to Bavaria, and has been on the EU list of priority energy investments since 
2006. However, the project has triggered protests by local inhabitants and 
23 The mobilisation of the local community against the extension of the “Stuttgart 21” trans-
port hub. The protests lasted for many months and strengthened the Green party which 
then formed a coalition government with the SPD after the state elections in March 2011. 
Cf. http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/best/2010-10-06/protesty-obywatelskie-oslabia-
ja-chadecje-w-badenii-wirtembergii (12.10.2012) and http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/
best/2011-03-30/wybory-do-parlamentow-landowych-wyznacznikiem-zmian-na-niemieck-
iej-scenie (12.10.2012).
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environmental organisations. In Lower Saxony, the inhabitants have launched 
the “Pro Erdkabel” initiative to demand an underground cable instead of the 
planned transmission line of 70-metre pylons between Braunschweig and Bad 
Hersfeld (the underground solution is four times as expensive)24. In Schleswig-
-Holstein, where the plan is to increase the output of wind farms three-fold 
by 2015, local civil initiatives have been launched in many places to protest 
against the construction of wind farms and high-voltage lines25. Currently in 
Germany there are around seventy civil initiatives against wind power, and 
a similar number of initiatives oppose the extension of transmission networks. 
Half of them were created in the years 2007–2009. According to a 2011 Allens-
bach survey, 76% of Germans declare they general understand such protests, 
and 68% accept even protests against projects that have already been approved 
for implementation26. 
The same initiatives which in the past were directed against nuclear power 
plants are now often being turned against projects necessary for nuclear en-
ergy to be replaced with “clean energy”. Conflicts are already arising between 
two environmental standpoints: the need to protect the natural environment 
on the one hand, and the need to develop environmentally friendly energy re-
sources on the other (“eco vs. eco”). The dispute about the pump-storage fa-
cility in Schwarzwald is a classic example. Pump storage is the most effective 
method of energy storage available today, but in this particular case it would 
require dams to be built over a 150-hectare area and would affect large swathes 
of forest land in Hotzenwald. The inhabitants of the nearby village have been 
protesting against the project and against the policy of the Baden-Württem-
berg government led by a Green politician, Winfried Kretschmann27. 
Environmental organisations such as BUND, Naturschutzbund, Greenpeace 
and Robin Wood, which are strong in Germany, have been playing an impor-
tant role in organising the protests and media campaigns against infrastruc-
tural investments. In 2007, some of them established the Klima-Allianz (Cli-
mate Alliance), which also includes numerous other social organisations and 
24 Ralph Bollmann, Im Netz der Bürgerproteste, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 
3.06.2012. 
25 Marlies Uken, Bürger fürchten sich vor Elektrosmog, Die Zeit Online, 28.02.2012.
26 Marco Althaus, Schnelle Energiewende - bedroht durch Wutbürger und Umweltverbände? 
Protest, Beteiligung und politisches Risikopotential für Großprojekte im Kraftwerk- und 
Netzausbau, TH Wildau, Wissenschaftliche Beiträge 2012, op.cit., p. 2.
27 Annika Stenzel, Öko gegen Öko, TAZ, 15.06.2011.
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trade unions representing a total of ten million citizens. The alliance has been 
mainly acting against the construction of coal-fired power plants. Its protests 
were successful in several places including Berlin and Krefeld. The instru-
ments that the environmental organisations resort to include not only politi-
cal pressure and media campaigns, but also legal measures such as filing court 
cases against energy projects that could pose a threat to the environment. 
According to a May 2011 ruling of the European Court of Justice, they may in-
voke EU laws to this end, which further strengthens their position28. 
2.2. democratising democracy 
The dispute over the plans to re-build the railway station in Stuttgart in par-
ticular convinced the political elite and the media that the role of citizens in 
large infrastructural projects should be reconsidered. Most experts conclude 
that the roots of the conflicts that have happened to date very often lay in the 
fact that the citizens were not sufficiently well-informed about government 
plans, that there was too little transparency and that citizens were included 
in the decision-making process at too late a stage, i.e. when they could only 
protest, but could no longer influence the shape of the project29. There is even 
a report by the Federation of German Industry (BDI), the country’s main em-
ployers organisation, which recognises the need to achieve a “new consensus” 
with regard to public approval of infrastructural projects. The report claims 
that this is a prerequisite of the success of the Energiewende30. 
Politicians, too, are aware of the risk of the success of the Energiewende being 
undermined or that its implementation may be delayed due to social protests 
stemming from insufficient citizen involvement in successive phases of infra-
structural project planning and implementation. The law on energy supply 
(EnWG) and the previously mentioned law on accelerated grid development 
(NABEG) were amended in the summer of 2011. In both cases special attention 
was paid to ensuring greater transparency in the decision-making processes 
and opportunities for citizens to have their say. The amended laws provide 
that resistance to planned investments should be tackled at as early a stage 
28 Althaus, op.cit., p. 9.
29 See: Energiewende und Bürgerbeteiligung: Öffentliche Akzeptanz von Infrastrukturpro-
jekten am Beispiel der “Thüringer Strombrücke”. Zusammenfassung der Studie, German-
watch, Mai 2012.
30 Quoted after: Althaus, op.cit., p. 4.
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as is possible and that lawsuits, which risk causing significant project delays, 
should be avoided or, if they do take place, their duration should be limited31.
Public consultations were organised as part of the works on the Network De-
velopment Plan (Netzentwicklungsplan) to be adopted by the end of 2012, which 
will lay down the routes of the projected new electricity transmission lines. 
For six weeks (ending on 10 July 2012) citizens were able to submit their com-
ments through an online platform set up for this purpose. The Federal Net-
work Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) then had eight weeks to adjust the plans and 
then present them again for public discussion. The Network Development Plan 
will subsequently be adopted by the Bundestag. Citizens will also be able to 
have their say on the specific routing of transmission lines at the local level. 
The largest number of conflicts will presumably arise at this stage since the 
original public consultation concerned only very general plans.
In the spring of 2012 the minister for transport Peter Ramsauer presented 
a draft “Manual of civil participation” which contains a “catalogue of practical 
and quickly implementable tips for good citizen participation in large projects 
in the area of transport”32. The minister’s proposals were presented as a reac-
tion to the previous negative experiences, but his critics have alleged that the 
manual is only “a manifestation of the crisis of confidence, which the minister 
is trying to overcome” because the measures it proposes to ensure citizen in-
volvement do not go beyond the right to be heard and submit comments33.
In any case, the streamlining of procedures and making them more transpar-
ent and more open to citizens may not be sufficient if the Energiewende is to 
gain durable legitimacy. The advocates of a deeper “democratisation of democ-
racy” (Claus Leggewie) have pointed out that a project on this scale requires 
constant citizen involvement, and not a one-off approval by the people for 
specific undertakings. To enable such involvement, the federal government’s 
Research Council for Global Climate Change has proposed that “Chambers for 
Future” (Zukunftskammer) be established at commune, regional, and national 
level. The chambers would have no decision-making powers, but would serve 
to strengthen the deliberative nature of democracy by including citizens in 
31 Tobias Montag, Netzausbau ohne Bürger?, Analysen und Argumente, Ausgabe 103, Mai 
2012, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, p. 3.
32 Planung von Großvorhaben im Verkehrssektor. Handbuch für eine gute Bürgerbeteiligung. 
Entwurf, Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung, Berlin (2012).
33 Christian Bommarius, Hauptsache Placebo, Frankfurter Rundschau, 16.03.2012.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
24
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
03
/2
01
3
discussions about the development of their local communities over the follow-
ing 20–30 years34. 
Ideas to ensure wider citizen acceptance for the Energiewende are not limited 
to the sphere of decision-making. The financial incentives are also important; 
given the scale of the changes taking place in connection with the Energiewende, 
there may result significant transformations in the economic and ownership 
structures in Germany. At the regional level, more and more citizens are tak-
ing over responsibility for the energy supply by establishing co-operatives and 
by buying energy companies previously held by municipalities or large cor-
porations. This applies in particular to the (inland) wind energy sector where 
“citizen wind farms” (Bürgerwindpark) owned by local communities are gain-
ing popularity35. Schleswig-Holstein has plans for citizens to have a possible 
financial involvement in the construction of transmission networks. They will 
be able to become co-owners and to draw on the profits of energy transmission. 
This form of “enfranchisement” of citizens is expected to improve the chances 
of the successful implementation of socially controversial projects. The Ger-
man Association of Towns and Municipalities has called on the federal govern-
ment to introduce licence fees payable to municipalities by owners of trans-
mission lines running through the territory of such municipalities. This would 
extend the ability of the municipalities to co-operate in energy production and 
would minimise conflicts36.
2.3. a new social contract
Social protests may delay the implementation of some infrastructural under-
takings, but they should not undermine the Energiewende as whole. Much de-
pends on how the federal, state, and local governments regulate citizen par-
ticipation. The experience so far shows that a total rejection of projects is rare 
(coal-fired power plants, which inspire fierce resistance, being an exception 
here). In the usual scenario citizens only wish to be informed and to have a say 
in decisions on specific issues such as the detailed routing of a transmission 
line or ways to protect the environment. Conflicts escalate when these two ele-
ments are not sufficiently guaranteed. 
34 Claus Leggewie, Mut statt Wut. Aufbruch in eine neue Demokratie, Hamburg, 2011, p. 159-164.
35 Windenergie in Bürgerhand. Energie von der Region für die Region, Bundesverband für 
Windenergie, Berlin, Juni 2012.
36 Deutscher Städte- und Gemeindebund fordert Konzessionsabgabe für Stromtrassen über Ge-
meinden. Gerd Landsberg im Gespräch mit Friedbert Meurer, 29.05.2012, Deutschlandfunk.
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This “expansion of democracy”, which was made politically necessary by the 
Energiewende, is a response to civil society’s expectations and its recent mobili-
sation, and it does not have to be an obstacle for the Energiewende. However, it is 
likely to produce a feedback loop whereby citizen activity will grow further in 
line with this civilisational project. The impact of the Energiewende is not lim-
ited to the sphere of energy supplies. In the medium and long term one should 
expect changes not only to the economy, but also to the way society and the state 
operate. The Energiewende may turn out to be the beginning of a “third industrial 
revolution” and a “great transformation” towards a green economy and society 
based on sustainable development. Torsten Albig of the SPD, the prime minister 
of Schleswig-Holstein, claims that by throwing its lot in with renewable energy, 
his state may play a role similar to that played by the Ruhr valley in the 19th and 
20th centuries. The lesson from the previous technological watersheds in energy 
use (the transition to coal in the 19th century and to oil in the 20th century) is that 
such turns always entail deep social transformations affecting people’s ways of 
life and how it is organized along with the organisation of economic structures 
and political systems. As in the previous cases, now too it will be necessary to 
conclude a new “social contract” that will redefine relations between the state, 
society and the economy. Negotiating this new social contract will be one the 
most important challenges for German politics in the coming decades. “Democ-
ratising democracy” is an element of this social change.
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ii. tHE LEGaL sEttinG oF ENERGIEWENDE
1. Legislation37
Germany’s new energy strategy is regulated by eight laws38 adopted on 
6 June 2011 by the federal government (and then put to vote at the Bun-
destag). These are: the law amending the nuclear energy law, the law on 
supporting renewable energy generation, the law on the accelerated de-
velopment of transmission networks, the law regulating energy supply, 
regulation amending the law on public procurement, the law establishing 
the Energy and Climate Fund, the law on tax breaks for building upgrades 
that enhance energy efficiency, and the law on strengthening the climate-
friendly development of towns and municipalities. Four ministries were 
responsible for drafting the laws: the Ministry of the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety, the Ministry of Economy and Techno-
logy, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Transport, Building and 
Urban Development.
 The majority of those laws entered into force in the summer of 2011. The law on 
supporting renewable energy generation (the renewable energy sources act), 
one of the most important bills for the Energiewende, was amended only in late 
June 2012 and entered into force retroactively as of 1 April 2012. This regulates 
the feeding of renewable-generated electricity into the grid and the payment 
of subsidies for the production of renewable energy. Works on the amendment 
started in January 2012. The most important sticking point concerned reducing 
subsidies for the manufacture and use of photovoltaic cells, which until then 
had been very popular. The solar industry is one of the most important sectors 
of industry in the new federal states of Germany. For this reason some federal 
states including Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia vetoed the draft during 
a vote at the Bundesrat in May 2012. A compromise that satisfied both the MPs 
37 As of 1 September 2012.
38 Dreizehntes Gesetz zur Änderung des Atomgesetzes, Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Rechts-
rahmens für die Förderung der Stromerzeugung aus erneuerbaren Energien (EEG), Gesetz 
über Maßnahmen zur Beschleunigung des Netzausbaus Elektrizitätsnetze (NABEG), Ge-
setz zur Neuregelung energiewirtschaftsrechtlicher Vorschriften (EnWGÄndG), Verord-
nung zur Änderung der Verordnung über die Vergabe öffentlicher Aufträge, Gesetz zur 
Änderung des Gesetzes zur Errichtung eines Sondervermögens “Energie- und Klimafonds” 
(EKFG-ÄndG), Gesetz zur steuerlichen Förderung von energetischen Sanierungsmaßnah-
men an Wohngebäuden, Gesetz zur Stärkung der klimagerechten Entwicklung in den Städ-
ten und Gemeinden.
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and the representatives of the federal states was reached during a meeting of 
the Mediation Committee of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat on 29 June 2012. 
Similar problems were encountered during works on the law on carbon cap-
ture and storage (CCS). This bill is not part of the package of laws regarded by 
the federal government as the core of the Energiewende legislation, but it is di-
rectly connected with the implementation of the new strategy. The Bundesrat 
rejected the CCS law in September 2011. As with the renewable energy law, the 
Mediation Committee of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat adopted a compro-
mise version of the draft after lengthy deliberations on 29 June 2012, and then 
the two chambers of the legislature adopted a bill authorising CCS. The final 
law, however, contains a clause allowing individual federal states to prohibit 
CCS in their territory. 
The law on energy efficiency, which regulates tax breaks related to upgrades 
and the thermal insulation of buildings, is currently in the process of being 
amended and it is another important legal act for the Energiewende. The law 
provides for financial support for upgrades of thermal insulation and heating 
installations of buildings to the amount of 1.5 billion euros a year. In this case 
the fact that it has not yet been adopted is due to opposition from the SPD and 
the Greens who have been calling for higher financing. The amendment has 
also been criticised by the federal states, which do not accept the proposals 
concerning tax breaks as an incentive for improving the energy efficiency of 
buildings since lower tax revenue would adversely affect the budgets of fed-
eral states. Works on formulating Germany’s position on the EU directive on 
energy efficiency have also given rise to controversy39. It was one of the most 
important areas of the dispute between the ministers for economy and for the 
environment. The draft directive adopted by the European Parliament, the Eu-
ropean Commission and the European Council provides, inter alia, that rules 
for improving energy efficiency should be enacted by member states and that 
each member state should reduce its energy consumption by 1.5% a year. Since 
there is no agreement between the federal administration and the federal 
states on this issue (even on matters that only concern Germany) implement-
ing the directive in Germany could pose problems. This is one of the reasons 
why Berlin demanded recognition of this kind of work (e.g. building upgrades) 
undertaken and completed in the past. 
39 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/efficiency/eed/eed_en.htm
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The ten-point action plan adopted by the government still before the Ener-
giewende was announced in September 2010 along with the previous energy 
strategy is also an important document for the energy transformation. The 
plan provides for, inter alia, the development of transmission networks, loans 
for the development of offshore wind farms and financing for upgrades of the 
energy efficiency of buildings. The plan’s implementation to date was assessed 
in March 2012 and was found to have been successful by the minister for the 
environment and the minister for economy40. 
However, nuclear waste storage remains an unresolved issue, and the prob-
lem is becoming ever more urgent, due to the accelerated schedule for shutting 
down nuclear reactors. Works are in progress on the selection and adaptation 
of an appropriate storage facility. As with carbon capture and storage, difficul-
ties in reaching agreement with the federal states and with opposition parties 
are the greatest obstacle to selecting the storage site for this hazardous waste. 
2. division of competences between federal ministries
At the federal level, oversight of the energy policy is divided between several 
ministries in charge of its different aspects. The Ministry of Economy and the 
Ministry of the Environment play the most important role, and the latter has 
gained wider competences since the Energiewende was announced and has be-
come the leading actor with regard to planning and implementation. 
The Ministry of Economy is in charge of, inter alia, electricity and gas supplies 
to consumers and the industry, the development of transmission networks, 
fair competition in the German energy market, subsidies to the production 
and use of renewable energy and also energy research, which is directly co-
ordinated by the Ministry of Education and Research. Within the Ministry of 
Economy, energy policy falls within the remit of a secretary of state.
The Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
is in charge of climate policy, enhancing energy efficiency, emissions trading 
and the development of renewable energy. The Ministry of the Environment 
also oversees nuclear energy, i.e. is in charge of the power plants still in opera-
tion and the transport and storage of radioactive waste. 
40 Cf. the federal government’s report on the implementation of the ten-point plan regarding 
the energy concept, http://www.bmu.de/pressemitteilungen/aktuelle_pressemitteilun-
gen/pm/48545.php
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The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the special funds to support the en-
ergy transformation, including the Energy and Climate Fund, as well as en-
ergy taxes41. Energy policy is within the remit of the Ministry’s Division IB3 
in the Directorate for Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Affairs; International 
Financial and Monetary Policy. 
The Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development is in charge of, 
inter alia, developing ways to reduce energy consumption in Germany and 
strengthening climate protection measures in construction law. The unit in 
charge is Division UI4 for Climate and Environmental Protection Policy.
The Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection is in charge of 
 legislation on biofuels, supporting the production of renewable resources 
(such as wood and biomass), and informing consumers about energy prices, le-
gal regulations and the energy market. The unit responsible for those matters 
is Division 524 “Bioenergy” in the Directorate for Sustainability and Renewable 
Resources. 
External energy policy, including in its European aspect, is in the remit of Di-
vision 410 in the Directorate-General for Economic Affairs and Sustainable De-
velopment at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Finally, the Chancellery is also an important actor at the federal level. Its role 
increased after the Energiewende was announced; this refers in particular to 
Division 43 “Industrial and Energy policy. Innovations” in the Directorate for 
Economic and Financial Policy. Officially, the Chancellery is not a leading actor 
in the Energiewende since its task is to mediate between the different minis-
tries. Most likely, though, it probably formulates guidelines for them, since the 
sudden turn in energy policy is Angela Merkel’s own idea and an important 
project of hers. 
3. competences of the federal government and states
The Energiewende was decreed at the federal level and it is the federal govern-
ment in Berlin that is responsible for related legislation and oversight of fed-
eral and state-level offices. However, the federal states enjoy broad autonomy 
in terms of energy policy. Germany’s constitutional principle of concurrent 
41 I.e. taxes on energy products used as heating materials and motor fuel.
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legislative power (Article 74.1 of the German Basic Law) applies to energy pol-
icy. This means that policy decisions concerning energy are made at both the 
federal and the state level42. Achieving the objectives of the Energiewende re-
quires active co-operation between the federal states, and in many areas its 
very feasibility depends on this co-operation. 
The German federal states are responsible for the implementation of federal 
laws and regulations in their respective territories. They are also able to in-
fluence the content of federal legislation through the Bundesrat. In princi-
ple, the competences of the federal states extend to all areas of energy pol-
icy which directly concern their territories or require financing from state 
budgets. These include such issues as the development of inland and offshore 
wind farms, the routing of transmission networks, the construction, mainte-
nance and oversight of conventional and nuclear power plants, the granting 
of construction and operation permits for power plants, as well as the stor-
age of nuclear waste. The German federal states attach great importance to 
their role in the implementation of Germany’s energy policy. For example, 
all of them have federal state ministries for energy (see Table). Most federal 
states have also enacted their own strategies for the development of their en-
ergy sectors43. There is no co-ordination between the strategies of individual 
federal states, and the strategies themselves are not always in line with the 
objectives of the federal government. This situation is a consequence of the 
fact that the central administration has informally taken over responsibil-
ity for the Energiewende and any related decisions. The governments of fed-
eral states officially accept this situation, but conflicts do erupt in some ar-
eas over the division of competences between the states and the federation. 
The development of transmission networks is a case in point. While network 
planning is in the remit of the federal government, it directly affects those 
federal states whose administrations are responsible for approving the spe-
cific routes of transmission lines. The federal government bears most of the 
brunt caused by delays in studies and assessments being issued since they 
slow down the implementation of the Energiewende). They do also affect those 
German federal states which rely on energy imports from other regions of 
Germany, though. 
42 Unlike, e.g. education, which is in the exclusive remit of the federal states.
43 See for example the energy policy guidelines of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern “Energieland 
2020” http://www.regierung-mv.de/cms2/Regierungsportal_prod/Regierungsportal/de/
vm/Themen/Energie/Leitlinien_Energieland_2020/index.jsp
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4. state ministries in charge of energy
Federal states Government ministry
Baden-Württemberg Greens/SPD
Ministry of the Environment, 
Climate Protection and  
the Energy Sector
Bavaria CSU/FDP
Ministry of Economy,  
Infrastructure, Transport  
and Technology
Berlin SPD/CDU
Ministry of Economy,  
Technology and Research
Brandenburg SPD/The Left
Ministry of Economic  
and European Affairs
Bremen SPD/Greens
Ministry of the Environment, 
Construction and Transport
Lower Saxony CDU/FDP
Ministry of the Environment, 
Energy and Climate Protection
Hamburg SPD
Ministry of Economy, Transport 
and Innovation
Hesse CDU/SPD
Ministry of Environment,  
Energy, Agriculture  
and Consumer Protection
Saarland CDU
Ministry of the Economy,  
Labour, Energy and Transport
Mecklenburg- 
-Vorpommern
SPD/CDU
Ministry of Energy, Infrastruc-
ture and State Development 
Rhineland-Palatinate SPD/Greens
Ministry of Economy, Climate 
Protection, Energy and Spatial 
Planning
North Rhine-Westphalia SPD/Greens
Ministry of Economy, Energy, 
Industry, Medium-Sized  
Business and Trade
Saxony CDU/FDP
Ministry of Economy, Labour 
and Transport
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Federal states Government ministry
Saxony-Anhalt CDU/SPD
Ministry of Research  
and Economy
Schleswig-Holstein CDU/FDP
Ministry of Energy, Agricultu-
re, the Environment and Rural 
Areas
Thuringia CDU/SPD
Ministry of Economy, Labour 
and Technology
The Energiewende does, though, involve some of the state’s competences being 
moved to the central administration. The Federal Network Agency is a case in 
point: it has been in charge of overseeing the development of transmission net-
works since the launch of the Energiewende. This solution infringes the prin-
ciple that the federal states should make decisions on energy policy measures 
which affect their territories. It gave rise to long debates and provoked resist-
ance from some federal states during work on the laws on the Energiewende44. 
Co-ordinating the different energy concepts of individual federal states, which 
often differ dramatically, is one of the main challenges of the Energiewende.
44 See for example: Länder und Bund ringen um Netz-Hoheit, Handelsblatt, 15.04.2011, http://
www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/energiepolitik-laender-und-bund-ringen-
um-netz-hoheit/4064196.html
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iii. Economic BacKGround and tHE situation  
in tHE EnErGy sEctor
1. the main economic assumptions of the Energiewende 
Due to the fact that it was announced at short notice and with a very tight im-
plementation schedule, the Energiewende had to be in line with the objectives of 
Germany’s existing climate and energy policy. 
There has been debate underway for several years on the falling levels of re-
serves of conventional energy and the consequences of the German economy’s 
dependence on foreign imports of energy resources. One of the main consider-
ations behind the adoption of the Energiewende was to limit Germany’s depend-
ence on energy imports and its susceptibility to energy price fluctuations. The 
government had adopted a strategy to increase the share of renewable energies 
in Germany’s energy mix already on 28 September 2010, its main objectives 
were:
•	 to limit climate-damaging greenhouse gas emissions by 40% below 1990 
levels to 2020, by 55% to 2030, by 70% to 2040 and by 80–95% to 2050;
•	 to lower primary energy consumption by 20% to 2020 and by 50% to 2050;
•	 to increase energy productivity with respect to final energy consumption 
by 2.1% a year;
•	 to reduce electricity consumption below 2008 levels by 10% to 2020 and by 
25% to 2050;
•	 to reduce demand for heat for buildings by 20% to 2020, and demand for 
energy by 80% to 2050;
•	 to ensure that renewable energies account for at least 18% of final energy 
consumption by 2020, 30% by 2030, 45% by 2040 and 60% by 2050.
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Figure 1. Production and distribution cost of primary energy produced in 
Germany and imported
source: http://www.bmwi.de/Dateien/BMWi/PDF/energiewende-in-deutschland,property=pdf,bereich
=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf, p. 10
As nuclear power plants are to be phased out earlier than had originally been 
planned, certain processes, which originally were expected to be spread out 
over longer periods, have to be accelerated. This objective is to be achieved 
through the faster development of renewable energy, as well as the extension 
of gas- and coal-fired power plants which are supposed to replace the nuclear 
power plants in the medium term before renewable energy generation fills the 
gap left by nuclear energy. The obligation to increase the share of renewable 
energy in Germany’s energy mix is now laid out in laws. The government’s new 
strategy emphasises the need to ensure cost-effectiveness, with a view to pro-
tecting the interests of companies in energy-intensive industries, for which 
energy price spikes could spell bankruptcy. The development of wind energy 
is the cornerstone of the strategy, with wind power expected to cater for 50% of 
Germany’s demand for electricity by 2050.
The second main element of the new strategy concerns bringing work on the 
development of energy transmission networks forward. Highly industrialised 
southern Germany is most susceptible to disruptions in the energy supply as 
a result of the phasing out of nuclear power plants (hence the dynamic growth in 
electricity imports from France after some of the nuclear power plants were shut 
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down), but the largest wind farms capable of satisfying the needs of industrial-
ised areas are located in the north. Thus, connecting the two regions of Germany 
by a high-capacity network has become a priority, along with research into new 
ways of storing energy. A debate is still ongoing on whether the government is 
right to be developing offshore wind farms in a situation where the technology 
of building such installations is yet to be tested in practice. Moreover, locating 
the wind farms in the north generates higher costs of investments into trans-
mission networks than would be incurred should they be constructed directly 
in the federal states that need most power. On the other hand, the government 
is concerned that electricity generation in wind farms inland would be less sta-
ble than offshore. Furthermore, the offshore wind farms are regarded as a sort 
of recompense for the energy companies which – in the decentralised model of 
energy generation – can count on no other large-scale investments.
In the short term, the gap in energy supplies caused by shutting down nuclear 
power plants is to be filled by conventional energy from gas- and coal-fired 
plants already under construction; according to the government’s estimates, 
the capacity of conventional power plants has to be extended by a further 
10 GW. The development of adequate smart transmission networks capable of 
co-ordinating the supply and demand of energy also plays a very important 
role in the new strategy. The output of unconventional power plants is typical-
ly subject to wide fluctuations between different times of the day and between 
seasons and these may lead to disruptions in the electricity supply. Therefore, 
unconventional plants have to be supported by conventional power plants 
(providing back-up capacity) and energy storage facilities. 
On 28 March 2012 the federal Ministry of Economy and the federal Ministry of 
the Environment jointly presented a ten-point action plan for the Energiewende, 
which also identified the most important problems impeding the transforma-
tion. The two most important issues identified by the ministries concerned bet-
ter regulation for the development of wind farms, and enhancing the capacity of 
transmission networks to meet the needs of the Energiewende45. The document 
also noted the need to create legislative mechanisms to revoke licences for the 
use of the most attractive wind farm sites if the investors holding such licences 
fail to carry out their investments in a timely fashion. Both ministries also em-
phasised the need to launch a support programme for the construction of ten 
offshore wind farms as soon as possible. The implementation of those projects 
45 http://www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/10-punkte-sofortprogramm_
bericht_bf.pdf 
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would offer an opportunity to gather experience that will be useful for the con-
tractors and operators working on successive projects. According to the authors 
of the plan, an adequate forum has been put in place to enable effective dialogue 
over efficient grid development and to kick-start work aimed at preparing legal 
bases for the construction of transmission lines connecting the wind farms in 
the North Sea and the Baltic. Another important element of the plan concerns 
exempting hydroelectricity power plants which store energy from transmission 
charges. Finally, the two ministries noted that transmission network operators 
still had no specific plans in place for network development. 
A report published by the federal Ministry of the Environment in June 2012 is 
another document that describes the progress made over the preceding year46. 
Its authors note that before June 2012, 24 transmission network projects were 
implemented, as a result of which 214 km of new transmission lines were built 
(out of the 3,800 km that need to be built by 2020). Moreover, the report ob-
served the need to accelerate the process of connecting the offshore wind farms 
to the grid, which is expected to provide a boost in their development. The 
report also states that Germany has started co-operation with Norway, Aus-
tria and Switzerland with a view to the extension of those countries’ pumped- 
-storage hydroelectricity power plants to store power surpluses in the future. 
As the report concluded that it was necessary to ratchet up the rate of development 
of offshore wind farms, it was followed by a joint presentation by the ministers for 
the environment and economy of a draft law facilitating investments in offshore 
wind farms. One of the measures provided for by the law consists in indemnities 
for investors if there are delays in connecting their wind farms to the grid.
2. importance of conventional energy resources for the German economy
Most energy in Germany is derived from conventional energy resources which 
are mostly imported from abroad.
oil accounts for the largest share (34%) in Germany’s primary energy con-
sumption because it represents a large proportion of fuel consumption in 
transport. Oil imports are being reduced by biofuel production in Germany. 
The government expects the role of oil to diminish in the future due to a more 
extensive use of gas and the development of electromobility. 
46 http://www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/broschuere_energiewende_weg_bf.pdf 
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natural gas is one of the most important sources of primary energy in Germany. 
In 2011 it accounted for 21.9% of the country’s primary energy consumption. With 
such a high position of gas in its energy mix, Germany was the second largest con-
sumer of gas in the EU after the United Kingdom, and accounted for 16.5% of total 
gas consumption in the European Union47. Domestic resources cover around 10% of 
Germany’s demand for gas, and this proportion is falling. The Energiewende will in-
crease Germany’s dependence on gas imports from abroad. However, the German 
government hopes that this adverse trend will be mitigated by increased energy 
generation from biomass and an increased production of biogas. According to some 
analyses, biogas could replace as much as 10 billion m3 of natural gas by 203048.
Figure 2. Domestic and imported gas consumption in Germany
source: Federal Office for Economics and Export Control (BAFA)
Figure 2 shows that, while gas consumption in Germany has stabilised in re-
cent years at around 4 thousand PJ (petajoules), this did not stop the upward 
trend in gas imports. The reason for this was that domestic gas extraction has 
in recent years fallen to half its previous level.
47 http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Energietraeger/gas.html 
48 http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Energietraeger/gas,did=292326.html 
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Figure 3. Source countries of Germany’s gas imports
source: Federal Office for Economics and Export Control (BAFA)
Figure 3 shows that the structure of imports has undergone no major changes 
and retains a good level of diversification. Russia remained the largest gas 
supplier to Germany over the last decade, with the exception of the year 2009 
when the German economy experienced the largest recession since the war 
and its GDP fell by 5%. Russia’s share in imports has increased by 2 percent-
age points since the beginning of the decade. Imports from Norway increased 
even more, by 6 percentage points between 2000 and 2011. Meanwhile the 
share of the Netherlands and the remaining importers has decreased. Despite 
the country’s strong dependence on gas imports from abroad, Germany con-
siders its gas supplies to be secure in the longer term. This conviction stems 
from the fact that both the set of suppliers and the gas import infrastructure 
are well diversified. Gas from Norway is transmitted via three separate gas 
pipelines with a total capacity of 54 billion m3. The infrastructure for gas sup-
plies from Russia is similarly diversified: Russian gas reaches Germany via 
pipelines in Poland (Yamal), Ukraine (Transgas) and directly via the Baltic 
Sea (Nord Stream). The prospects of the Nabucco gas pipeline, which could 
diminish Russia’s share in Germany’s gas imports, are unclear at this stage. 
Germany also considers its practice of concluding long-term supplies con-
tracts as a way of making gas supplies secure. Finally, gas storage facilities 
also improve the security of gas supplies. Currently there are 47 gas depots 
in Germany, with a capacity of 20 billion m3 of gas. This is estimated to cover 
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the country’s needs for 80 days. Work is in progress to increase the existing 
storage capacity by 20%49.
coal is still important for the German economy. Bituminous coal and lignite ac-
count, respectively, for 12.6% and 11.7% of Germany’s primary energy consump-
tion. These two resources play an even more important role in electricity gen-
eration: 43.5% of electricity is produced from coal (24.9% from lignite and 18.6% 
from bituminous coal)50. Power plants and the steel industry were the main con-
sumers of coal in 2011 in Germany (accounting for 70% and 27%, respectively, of 
total consumption). Due to it being less competitive than imports, German coal is 
subsidised to an amount of around 1.7 billion euros per year. The European Com-
mission has authorised a four-year extension (to 2018) of the subsidies scheme.
3. importance of renewable energy sources for the German economy
As a result of Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear energy and immediately 
shut down eight nuclear power plants, the importance of renewable energy 
sources increased dynamically. In 2011, the share of renewable energy in total 
electricity consumption increased to 20% against 17.1% the preceding year. 
Figure 4. Share of renewable energy in final energy consumption: electricity, 
heat and fuel 
source: http://www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/ee_in_zahlen_2011_bf.pdf, p. 16
49 http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Energietraeger/gas,did=292330.html 
50 http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Energietraeger/kohle.html
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This growth was possible mainly due to the increase in power generation in 
wind farms and photovoltaic installations. The share renewable energy has in 
overall final energy consumption is nearly half that in electricity consumption 
where it increased from 11.3% to 12.2% in the period in question. Renewable 
sources of energy represent a smaller share of total energy production because 
they account for a much smaller proportion of heat consumption (10.4%) and 
fuel consumption (5.6%) than of electricity consumption (20.0%). A strong up-
ward trend was observed in recent years as regards the role of green technolo-
gies in electricity generation, which had been growing steadily since 2004. 
The share of green technologies in heat generation has been subject to greater 
fluctuations, but it has also been growing faster since 2007. In the case of fuel 
production, on the other hand, the significance of renewable energies is low 
and their share has again fallen after having risen in 2004–2007. 
table 1. Main indices of renewable energy consumption in Germany
2010 2011 change
Share of renewable energy in total 
electricity consumption
17.1% 20.0% +17.0%
Final energy from renewable energy 
sources
104 billion 
kWh
122 billion 
kWh
+17.3%
Share of renewable energy in final 
heat consumption
10.2% 10.4% +2.0%
Share of renewable energy in fuel 
consumption
5.8% 5.6% -3.4%
Share of renewable energy in final 
energy consumption
11.3% 12.2% +8.0%
Share of renewable energy in prima-
ry energy consumption
9.7% 10.9% +12.4%
Total final energy from renewable 
sources 
284 billion 
KWh 
295 billion 
kWh
+3.8%
source: http://www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/ee_in_zahlen_2011_bf.pdf, p. 4
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Figure 5. Germany’s final energy consumption: renewable energy 
source: http://www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/ee_in_zahlen_2011_bf.pdf, p. 7
A comparative analysis of the importance of different sources of unconven-
tional energy reveals the dominant role of biomass, due to its significance in 
heat generation and fuel production. Geothermal energy and photovoltaics are 
the only other green energy sources that can also be used to generate heat. 
In this comparative analysis, the remaining renewable energy sources play 
a much smaller role than biomass, which accounts for 67.1% of total renewable 
energy consumption. 
Figure 6. Germany’s final energy consumption: renewable electricity 
source: http://www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/ee_in_zahlen_2011_bf.pdf, p. 7
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A comparative analysis of the roles of different renewable energy sources in 
electricity generation highlights the significance of wind power, which ac-
counts for 38.2% (46.5 billion KWh) of total electricity from unconventional 
sources, and 15.8% of total renewable energy. Germany’s output of wind-
-generated electricity increased by 23% in 2011, the increase being mainly 
due to a considerable expansion of wind farm capacity, but also unfavourable 
weather conditions in the preceding year, which had adversely affected wind 
power output in 2010. In 2011 Germany had a total of 895 wind farms with a to-
tal capacity of 2,007 MW. 
Biomass is the second most important source of renewable electricity, account-
ing for 30.3% (36.9 billion kWh) of total electricity from renewable sources and 
67.1% of all “green” energy in Germany. In 2011, a 3% decrease of biomass con-
sumption in the total energy mix was reported, however, electricity genera-
tion from biomass increased by 8%. The significance of biomass stems primar-
ily from its important role in heat generation. In 2011, 126.5 billion kWh of heat 
was produced from biomass. Biomass is also the only renewable energy source 
that plays an important role in fuel production, accounting for 34.3 billion kWh 
of energy in the form of fuels in 2011. 
solar installations accounted for 18.4% of renewable-generated electricity 
consumed in 2011 in Germany, which corresponds to 6.5% of total “green” en-
ergy. Germany’s solar installations market is the fastest-developing market 
segment in Germany today – the total capacity of photovoltaic installations 
increased by 62.4% in 2011 against 2010, reaching 24.8 GW. If this growth rate 
is maintained, photovoltaic electricity output may soon surpass the output of 
wind power. 
Hydroelectricity power plants are another important source of renewable 
electricity, generating 14.6% of renewable energy consumed in Germany. Their 
output in 2011, however, was 8% lower than in the previous year due to adverse 
weather conditions, despite the fact that available capacity increased as a re-
sult of the extension of a hydroelectricity power plant on the Rhine. Finally, 
geothermal power plants, which mostly generate heat, accounted for 2.1% 
of renewable energy consumption in Germany. 
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Figure 7. Revenues from, and investments into, different sectors of the rene-
wable energy industry in 2011 
source: http://www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/ee_in_zahlen_2011_bf.pdf, p. 19
The above comparison of investments into, and revenues from, the different 
sectors of the renewable energy industry demonstrates the scale of spending 
on renewable energy, even while revenues from those investments are much 
lower than the funds invested. In 2011, only the biomass and hydroelectric 
power sectors reported revenues higher than investments. The reason was 
that investments in the two sectors were lower in recent years since they had 
been more heavily invested into in the period before the Energiewende, and 
their profitability is higher than that of the other renewable energy sources. 
In the other sectors, especially in photovoltaic installations and wind farms, 
spending significantly exceeded revenues because of the huge scale of invest-
ments into these two sectors. Moreover, in the case of photovoltaic installa-
tions, part of the explanation may be the fact that they are often used by house-
holds which use the energy they produce for their own needs.
Renewable energy is an important sector of the German economy, but it is not 
yet a key sector. According to the federal Ministry of the Environment, the 
renewable energy industry employed 382,000 people in 2011, which represents 
an increase of 129% over the last eight years. The total turnover of companies in 
this sector reached 24.9 billion euros in 2011 (including exports). 
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Figure 8. Employment in the most important industries in Germany in 2011
source: Federal Ministry of Economy and http://wirtschaft.t-online.de/das-sind-die-groessten-bran-
chen-in-deutschland/id_50517572/index 
The above comparison of employment figures between energy and other sec-
tors shows that the energy industry ranks among the ten most important in 
the economy. The entire energy industry employed around 600,000 people 
in 2009, of which around 39% were employed in the conventional energy sec-
tor. The number of jobs in the unconventional energy sector is not very high in 
comparison with the largest sectors of the economy, but its growth dynamics 
suggests that in future it may become an important arm of the German econ-
omy. Among the ca. 333,000 people employed in the renewable energy indus-
try, around 62% are employed in equipment manufacturing, 20% in service 
and maintenance, and 17% in distribution. The Ministry of the Environment 
estimates that employment in this sector will increase to 500,000–600,000 
by 2030. However, this growth will be accompanied by falling employment in 
companies dealing with conventional energy, so it is difficult to say whether 
it will really contribute to an increase in the overall number of jobs.
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Figure 9. Employment in the renewable energy industry by sector
source: Federal Ministry of the Environment
An analysis of employment figures in the different sectors of the renewable 
energy industry shows that wind power, solar power and biomass account for 
a significant majority of jobs in the industry. In most sectors of the renewables 
industry, employment has been rather stable in recent years. Solar power is an 
exception, reporting faster growth in employment due to state subsidies for the 
installation of solar collectors. However, the number of jobs in this area is un-
likely to continue to grow at a similar rate in the future because competition 
from China is becoming stronger, and the subsidies for solar installations have 
recently been reduced, which led to bankruptcy for many manufacturers in 2011. 
Renewable energy technologies are one of the fastest growing branches of Ger-
man exports, but it is difficult to accurately assess the rate of this growth as 
no up-to-date figures on growth dynamics are available. In 2007, Germany 
exported nearly 9 billion euros worth of renewable electricity installations. 
The sale of wind farm components accounts for 85% of this revenue. Germany 
hopes that exports of this technology in particular may become a German spe-
ciality due to the country’s traditionally strong competitive advantage in the 
machine-building industry. Europe was the destination for 45% of the exports, 
while Asia accounted for 26%, and the US for 25%51. According to the German 
51 http://www.unendlich-viel-energie.de/de/wirtschaft/detailansicht/browse/1/article/188/
exportmaerkte-fuer-erneuerbare-energien-aus-deutschland.html 
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Institute for Economic Research, green technology exports accounted for 1.9% 
of Germany’s total exports of industrial products in 201052.
4. Financing the Energiewende
Various forms of government support for the deployment of renewable energy 
installations, administered by various ministries, existed even before the Ger-
man government decided to phase out nuclear energy. Germany had stepped up 
financing for renewable energy sources already in 2010, before the Fukushima 
nuclear disaster, by increasing the renewable energy surcharge on electricity 
bills. Moreover, the Energy and Climate Fund was established in 2010, with the 
tax on nuclear power plants as its main source of financing. It took over ongoing 
energy projects from various ministries, in order to provide those projects with 
a stable source of financing. In this context, the Energiewende simply entailed 
a continuation of plans to increase the surcharge on electricity bills, which dat-
ed back to 2010, and a decision that the Energy and Climate Fund should receive 
more funding from the sale of carbon credits. From the financial point of view, 
then, one could say that the Fukushima disaster was used to lend a new political 
impulse to old ideas, but without assigning any major new pools of financing from 
the federal budget. It was also useful in justifying the sacrifices that the public 
was expected to make by paying ever higher electricity bills that were growing 
mainly due to the renewable energy subsidies. This has been particularly painful 
in the context of the financial crisis. Finally, the Energiewende also provided a jus-
tification for increasing the budget of the federal Ministry of the Environment in 
2012–2013, which had been cut the two previous years. This, however, does not 
change the fact that even with the 13% increase, this ministry’s budget for 2009- 
-2013 is not significantly larger than the budgets of other ministries53.
The largest share of the burden of renewable energy subsidies is borne directly 
by individual energy consumers and those companies which have not been ex-
empted from surcharges for the financing of renewable energy development. 
In 2000 the German government (then the SPD and the Greens) introduced 
electricity bill surcharges (EEG-Umlagen) to support companies producing 
energy from unconventional sources (which were less competitive than con-
ventional energy sources). The surcharge meant that the prices of electricity 
increased by 20% over the base price. Particularly energy-intensive businesses 
52 http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.388573.de/11-45-4.pdf, p. 4.
53 http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/Finanz po-
litik/2012/03/2012-03-21-PM10anl2.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4, p. 9.
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were made eligible for exemption from the surcharge. In 2011, this exemption 
applied to around 600 German companies employing around 1 million people, 
which were entitled to tax breaks worth a total of around 2.2 billion euros. 
Some of them are also eligible for exemptions from the electricity transmission 
charge. The government is expected to take further exemptions into consider-
ation, in particular for small and medium-sized entities (SMEs)54. Apart from 
the renewable energy surcharges, a co-generation surcharge (KWK-Umlage) is 
also in place to support combined generation of heat and electricity in order to 
increase the efficiency of energy production. However, energy-intensive com-
panies are eligible for a partial exemption from the surcharge, and its maxi-
mum rate is 0.05 cents per 1 KWh. The exemptions from the surcharges cost 
the remaining electricity consumers and the non-privileged companies (90% 
of companies) 700 million euros a year and added an additional approx. 18 eu-
ros to the average household’s fuel bill in 201155.
Figure 10. Total amount of electricity bill surcharges collected from non- 
-privileged electricity consumers
source: http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/broschuere_ee_za-
hlen_bf.pdf, p. 42
54 http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/Publikationen/jahreswirtschaftsbericht-
2012,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf, p. 55.
55 http://www.unendlich-viel-energie.de/uploads/media/48_Renews_Spezial_Indust-
riechancen.pdf 
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The electricity bill surcharge is intended to cover losses that distributors could 
suffer from trading renewable electricity in the markets. The surcharges have 
grown systematically since 2000, with dramatic increases of 77.4% and 28.7% 
respectively in the years 2010–2011. 
Figure 11. Distribution of subsidies financed from electricity bill surcharges 
in 2011
source: Federal Ministry of the Environment
It is interesting to see how the surcharge revenue is distributed among the 
different sources of renewable energy. In 2011 55.4% of the funds was trans-
ferred to the producers of solar power, followed by owners of biomass instal-
lations who accounted for 27.1% of the total. Producers of wind power were 
the third and last sector to receive a significant amount of funds, accounting 
for 16.5% of the total. Compared to 2009, before the decision to shut down 
some nuclear power plants, subsidies grew fastest for wind power (by 174%), 
photovoltaic power (by 152%) and hydroelectric power (by 144%), although 
the amounts of subsidies for all these sources of energy were subject to large 
fluctuations because of considerable variations in the amounts of energy 
produced. However, the trends are not fully in line with the government’s 
assumptions, since a major portion of surcharge revenue goes to the solar 
power sector while it is wind power that is crucial for the implementation of 
the Energiewende. 
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Figure 12. Components of household electricity bills in Germany 
source: http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/broschuere_ee_za-
hlen_bf.pdf, p. 43
The renewable energy surcharge has been the fastest-growing component of 
electricity bills in Germany. In 2011, the surcharge was 3.53 cents per 1 KWh, 
with the price of 1 KWh of electricity at 25.2 cents on average. This means the 
surcharge made up 13.9% of the price of 1 KWh of electricity, against only 5.1% 
in 2008. 
The expanded budget of the Energy and Climate Fund, which now receives 
the total revenue from Germany’s additional CO2 emissions allowances, was 
supposed to be the most important new financial resource of the Energiewende. 
The increase was intended to make up for the funding gap created by a de-
crease in revenue from the tax on nuclear power plants after some of the plants 
were shut down. 
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Figure 13. Distribution of financing from the Energy and Climate Fund under 
the amended 2012 budget
source: http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/Finanzpoli-
tik/2012/03/2012-03-21-PM10anl2.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4, p. 15
Along with the new resources, the fund has taken over tasks that were previously 
being implemented by different ministries, i.e. it will continue programmes pre-
viously financed from the budgets of individual ministries. The programme for 
the thermal insulation of buildings, launched in 2005, may serve as an example. 
Germany has also been taking action for climate protection at the international 
level and for the development of renewable technologies for several years. Since 
2009, the country has been supporting electromobility through stimulus pack-
ages. Moreover, it should be noted that even before the Energiewende, revenue 
from the sale of CO2 emissions allowances was earmarked for climate protection 
purposes within the budget of the federal Ministry of the Environment. In 2008, 
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932 million euros was spent on climate protection, followed by 900 million eu-
ros in 200956. The Ministry of Infrastructure has an ongoing programme to sup-
port the insulation of houses and flats, aimed at reducing CO2 emissions. It spent 
7.4 billion euros on this in the years 2006–2011. 
Some of the money from the Energy and Climate Fund is used to finance other 
actions. A governmental reply to a question from the Green party in 2011 re-
vealed that the government intends to use up to 5% of the Fund’s resources in 
2013–2016 to finance the extension of effective conventional power plants57. 
In 2012, the press reported on the Fund’s difficulties in raising the projected 
amount of funding due to the fact that market prices of CO2 emissions allow-
ances were much lower than expected. For instance, in February the price was 
7.5 euros, compared to the projected 17 euros58. As a result, the government was 
forced to allocate the total revenue from the sale of CO2 emissions allowances to 
the Energy and Climate Fund during the June amendment of the budget. Many 
representatives of business believe that even that will not suffice to ensure the 
fund raises the projected revenue59. This would corroborate the projections of 
the 2013–2016 Financial Plan, in which the fund’s was downsized by 28% from 
9.8 billion euros to 7.1 billion euros in 2013–201560 and, consequently, its spend-
ing on all categories of action was cut. This decrease in financing shows that 
the original plans concerning spending on the Energiewende have proved to 
have been overly optimistic, and that effective budget consolidation is more 
important for the government. 
Apart from the Energy and Climate Fund, the implementation of the Ener-
giewende will be financed mainly from the environmental protection budgets 
of the three ministries involved. Most of this funding has been allocated for 
programmes adopted earlier, whose implementation began even before the 
Energiewende was announced. The federal Ministry of Environment had a budget 
56 http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/Finanzpo-
litik/2009/2009-12-16-PM58.html 
57 http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/kohlekraft-subventionen-aus-klimafonds-re-
gierung-will-dreckschleudern-aus-klimafonds-subventionieren-1.1119626 
58 http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/energiewende-merkels-klimafonds-fehlt-das-
geld-a-814765.html 
59 http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/energie-energiewende-wirtschaft-warnt-vor-
geldmangel_aid_817083.html 
60 http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Monatsberichte/2012/07/Inhalte/Ka-
pitel-3-Analysen/3-1-regierungsentwurf-bundeshaushalt-2013-und-Finanzplan-2016.html 
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of 1.6 billion euros for such programmes in 2012. This money is to be spent on 
a programme to promote the use of renewable energy, whose budget will be 
346 million euros in 2012, 335 million euros in 2013 and 337 million euros in 
2014–201561. The federal Ministry of Education has been allocated 423 million 
euros to support energy and climate research. The Ministry of Economy has 
a budget of 120.9 million euros, to be spent mainly on supporting the export of 
renewable energy technologies and on enhancing energy efficiency. 
The programme for the co-financing of offshore wind farms is a form of sup-
port created specifically for the purposes of the Energiewende. The govern-
ment-owned bank KfW has allocated around 5 billion euros for the creation 
of ten offshore wind farms62. 
Figure 14. Investment support under the government programme of incenti-
ves for renewable heat generation 
source: http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/broschuere_ee_za-
hlen_bf.pdf, p. 49
61 http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Oeffen-
tliche_Finanzen/Bundeshaushalt/beratungen-zum-bundeshaushalt-2012-im-bundestag-
anlage2.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3, s.34
62 http://www.bmu.de/energiewende/beschluesse_und_massnahmen/doc/47465.php 
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The government has been supporting the use of renewable energy in heat and 
power generation through its market incentive programme (Marktanreizpro-
gramm). The programme also includes an instrument of subsidies for smaller 
installations in detached and semi-detached houses, as well as loans (that can 
be optionally written off) for larger heating installations, e.g. in municipali-
ties. In practice, this support has accounted for 10–20% of investments which 
totalled 8.9 billion euros over the last 12 years, and has contributed to the in-
stallation of over one million solar installations and 270,000 smaller biomass 
installations. 
5. consequences of the faster implementation of the Energiewende
5.1. rising energy prices
The significant increase in energy prices paid by households and companies is 
the most painful consequence of accelerating the implementation of the Ener-
giewende. If the current price growth dynamics remains unchanged, the im-
plementation of the Energiewende may have to be slowed down due to the budg-
et being unable to recompense consumers for the increase in energy costs.
Figure 15. Components of the electricity bill surcharge
source: http://www.bee-ev.de/3:1168/Meldungen/2012/EEG-Umlage-2013-Foerderbetrag-fuer-
Erneuerbare-steigt-auf-2.3-Cent-pro-Kilowattstunde-Strom.html
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The most rapid rise in the renewable energy surcharge was over 2010 and 2011 
when it rose by 61.5% and 66.7%, respectively and it was the most important 
cause of electricity price increases in Germany. According to September 2012 
calculations by the German Renewable Energy Federation (BEE), the surcharge 
will increase again in 2013 by 45% over 2012, from 3.59 to 5.21 cents per 1 KWh 
because all the components of electricity prices are set to increase. It is worth 
noting that the current structure of the surcharge favours large energy buy-
ers at the expense of individual consumers. The excess of subsidised energy 
from renewable sources causes energy prices to go down in exchange markets, 
which is where the largest energy consumers buy electricity. As a result of this 
mechanism, they have access to cheaper electricity, while consumers are bear-
ing the cost of the system’s functioning.
It seems that the federal government is starting to notice the disadvantages 
of the current system of financing, as is evidenced by the criticism of compa-
nies investing in renewable energies and the federal state governments, spelt 
out by the new minister for the environment Peter Altmaier63. Altmaier stated 
directly that the current wind farm development plans risk the creation of an 
excess of capacity and are insufficiently co-ordinated. In his view, if they are 
put into practice, the 35% target of the share renewable energies in the energy 
mix until 2020 will be exceeded by 60%. The minister has also expressed his 
doubts as to the feasibility of wind power exports from the northern federal 
states to southern Germany because the southern federal states aim to become 
self-sufficient in terms of energy. This statement could be interpreted as ex-
pressing concern about a too rapid development of the renewable energy sector, 
which would entail dynamically rising electricity bills64. Some commentators 
interpreted Altmaier’s statement as spelling out support for groups lobbying 
for offshore wind farms, which will generate profits for large companies but at 
the same time require costly investments in transmission networks. 
The accelerated implementation of the Energiewende will at least temporarily 
entail higher energy costs for companies. According to estimates by German 
institutions and offices65, in 2008, i.e. when the renewable energy surcharge 
was still only around 1.1 cents per 1 kWh, it represented around 0.1% of the total 
costs of German companies, with total energy spending accounting for 2% of 
63 http://www.taz.de/Laender-kritisieren-Altmaier/!101909/ 
64 http://www.taz.de/Kommentar-Windenergieplaene/!101913/ 
65 http://www.unendlich-viel-energie.de/uploads/media/48_Renews_Spezial_Indust-
riechancen.pdf 
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costs. Increasing the surcharge to 3.53 cents per 1 kWh should not adversely 
affect the German economy’s international competitiveness. It is therefore 
expected that, should the government manage to stabilise the surcharge rate, 
businesses will not be harmed. It is significant that energy-intensive sectors 
are not burdened with these costs. If, however, spending on distribution net-
works grows and the renewable energy sector develops too slowly, there is 
a risk that Energiewende-related burdens on companies will grow. The govern-
ment hopes that those burdens may partly be offset by lower electricity prices 
in exchange markets and the fact that companies will need to buy fewer CO2 
emissions allowances. The Energiewende will also have the added advantage of 
lower import needs, which should stabilise energy prices. 
However, it is worth noting that the prices of energy in Germany have become 
much less competitive in comparison with the situation in other countries. Ac-
cording to figures from the federal Ministry of Economy, in 2008 energy prices 
for industry (excluding VAT) oscillated around 10.66 cents per 1 KWh, which 
means that Germany ranked 9th in the European Union in terms of the price of 
electricity. By 2011, electricity prices for industry in Germany increased by 17% 
to 12.48 cents per 1 KWh and Germany moved up to 5th position. If this tenden-
cy gathers strength, it may have an adverse effect on exports, which are key for 
the German economy, accounting for over 50% of GDP. This may be particularly 
difficult for companies, considering that wages are expected to rise faster in 
the coming years. Employee pay has been stable in recent years, contributing 
to the competitiveness of German companies. In this context, Germany was 
accused of having contributed to the problems of the southern members of the 
eurozone through excessive exports. In the coming years wages are expected 
to rise in Germany, the first sign of this trend coming from the 4% increase in 
wages in the most important sectors of the economy in 2012. 
Politicians are increasingly aware of the problem of rising electricity prices. 
In his statements in September 2012 Mr Altmaier stressed that he would look 
for solutions to limit the dynamic growth of electricity prices in Germany and 
seek a slowing down of the development of renewable energy. The EU commis-
sioner for energy Günther Oettinger during his visit to Berlin in October 2012 
also observed that the fact that energy prices were rising as a result of meas-
ures taken to combat climate change was an excessive burden on industry66. 
66 A. Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, K. Popławski, Oettinger is criticising the increasing costs of the 
climate protection policy, CEWeekly, Issue 33(171), http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
ceweekly/2012-10-10/oettinger-criticising-increasing-costs-climate-protection-policy 
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Angela Merkel, on the other hand, has firmly announced that the subsidies 
for renewable energy will stay in place and suggested that a reduction of so-
cial security contrbutions could recompense consumers for the rising energy 
prices67. However, the government’s room for manoeuvre in this regard is lim-
ited because of the budget savings and cuts it is obliged to make due to the debt 
brake rule68, and also because it needs to be prepared to incur the higher costs 
of rescuing the eurozone. Until now, the budget has been benefiting from lower 
costs of debt servicing, but it is unclear how durable this tendency will be. 
5.2. changes in the balance of foreign electricity trade
The decision to accelerate the implementation of the Energiewende caused 
a temporary shortage of electricity in Germany which meant the country had 
to import electricity from its neighbours in the months that followed. It is dif-
ficult to say if Germany will be able to continue running surpluses in its for-
eign electricity trade in the longer term. If the country opts for the scenario of 
a slower implementation of the Energiewende, it may have to import renewable 
energy, or even conventional energy, from abroad.
Figure 16. Balance of Germany’s foreign electricity trade
source: Federal Ministry of Economy
67 http://www.rheinpfalz.de/cgi-bin/cms2/cms.pl?cmd=showMsg&tpl=rhpMsg_thickbox.
html&path=/rhp/welt/wirt&id=1347897206 
68 As of 2016, Germany’s structural deficit (excluding one-off spending and, consequently, 
higher unemployment) must not exceed 0.35% of GDP.
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Since 2002, Germany has systematically reported surpluses in its electricity 
trade with other countries. In 2011, even though a deficit was reported in the 
first months, the country ultimately still ran a surplus, which nevertheless 
dropped significantly from 17 TWh in 2010 to 6 TWh, i.e. by 65%, meaning 
that the value of the surplus dropped from 1 billion euros to 0.37 billion euros 
in 201169. 
Figure 17. Balance of Germany’s electricity trade with selected countries
source: Report: Energieverbrauch in Deutschland im Jahr 2011, AG Energienbilanzen, p. 28
An analysis of the balance of electricity trade with different countries shows 
that the energy shortage was mainly filled by French, Swedish and Danish 
power plants. The dynamic growth of electricity imports from France is nota-
ble; in 2011 it increased by 120% over 2009 levels. However, this dynamic up-
ward trend in electricity imports from France is expected to subside. Figures 
for the first half of 2012 seem to confirm this: they show that imports from 
France have decreased by 38%. In the same period imports from Sweden and 
Denmark have grown considerably by 443% and 186%, respectively70. Germany 
ultimately reported an export surplus of 10 TWh in the period in question. 
69 Federal Statistical Office of Germany.
70 Energienverbrauch in Deutschland: Daten für das 1. Halbjahr, AG Energienbilanzen, p. 23.
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5.3. changes in the imports of energy resources 
A successful Energiewende could reduce Germany’s dependence on energy re-
source imports, which currently ranges from 77% to 97%, depending on the 
type of resource. This could provide a strong boost for economic development, 
as some of the funds hitherto spent on imports could be invested domestically. 
This, in turn, could further increase Germany’s foreign trade surplus, which 
was one of the highest in the world in 2011 at 158 billion euros. 
Figure 18. Share of imports in the consumption of different energy resources
source: Federal Ministry of Economy
On the other hand, lower imports of some energy resources could potentially 
increase the importance of other resources, especially gas, as a result of which 
Germany could end up importing more gas from Russia.
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table 2. Scenarios of conventional energy consumption to 2023; net nominal 
capacity (GW)
Base year 
2011
Power plants 
under con-
struction / 
to be closed
scenario a 
2023
scenario B 
2023
scenario c 
2023
nuclear energy 12.1 0.0/12.1 0 0 0
Lignite 20.2 2.7/5.3 19.3 17.6 17.6
Bituminous coal 26.3 8.0/8.5 31.9 25.8 25.8
natural gas 26.6 0.9/5.7 22.8 31.9 31.9
oil 3.8 0.0/1.1 2.7 2.7 2.7
Pumped storage 6.4 no data 10.9 10.9 10.9
other 4.1 0.2/0.2 3.3 3.3 3.3
total 99.3 11.8/32.9 90.9 92.2 92.2
source: http://www.netzausbau.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Szenariorahmen/Eingereichter%20
Szenariorahmen%20zum%20NEP%202013.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, p. 8
On 17 July 2012 the Federal Network Agency published its grid development sce-
narios for 2013–2022 along with forecasts concerning the capacity of conven-
tional and unconventional sources of energy in Germany. The scenarios differ 
mainly in terms of the projected total capacity (with scenario A projecting low-
er energy consumption, and scenarios B and C – higher energy consumption), 
but all of them assume that conventional capacity will decrease by around 10%. 
According to Scenario A, the capacity of unconventional power plants will in-
crease twofold, but at the same time the capacity of coal-fired power plants will 
also increase considerably, while the capacity of lignite-fired plants will decrease 
slightly, and the capacity of gas-fired plants will decrease significantly. Accord-
ing to scenarios B and C, the capacity of coal and lignite-fired power plants will 
decrease while the importance of natural gas-fired power plants will rise. 
The figures on power plants to be extended and those to be shut down by 2023 
are also interesting. They show that in order to implement any of the scenari-
os, the government will have to create conditions for the development of con-
ventional power plants because Germany will need to make up at least 10 GW 
of conventional power plant capacity. 
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table 3. Scenarios for the consumption of unconventional energy to 2023;  
net nominal capacity (GW)
Base year 
2011
scenario a  
2023
scenario B 
2023
scenario c 
2023
offshore wind 
power 0.2 9.8 13.1 17.8
inland wind 
power 29.1 45.9 49.5 84.5
Photovoltaics 25.1 55.1 61.1 51.8
Hydroelectric 
power 4.7 4.8 5.0 4.8
Biomass 5.3 7.9 8.7 7.3
other 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.4
total 65.1 124.1 138.7 167.6
source: http://www.netzausbau.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Szenariorahmen/Eingereichter%20
Szenariorahmen%20zum%20NEP%202013.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, p. 11
With regard to renewable energy, Scenario A foresees that the capacity of off-
shore wind farms will increase to fifty times its level in 2011, and the capacity 
of inland wind farms will rise 1.5 times, while the capacity of photovoltaic in-
stallations will double. In Scenario B the potential of all types of unconvention-
al power plants will rise. Finally, in Scenario C the increase in the capacity of 
photovoltaic installations will be the lowest, while the capacity of wind farms 
will increase considerably.
Based on these scenarios it is possible to draw some conclusions about future 
trends in Germany’s imports. Scenario A, which projects a moderate increase 
in the capacity of renewable power plants, is the only one in which the ca-
pacity of gas-fired power plants will decrease by approximately 15%. In the 
remaining scenarios, the capacity of gas-fired power plants will increase by 
around 20%. Germany should therefore be expected to step up its gas im-
ports, unless it starts to extract gas from its own unconventional deposits, 
an idea which the public has so far strongly resisted. Meanwhile government 
documents project a stable or diminished demand for gas. Germany will also 
most likely increase its imports of bituminous coal and lignite, especially in 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
61
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
03
/2
01
3
view of the cuts to lignite coal mine subsidies in 2018 (although the govern-
ment may consider extending the subsidies). The scenarios project a consid-
erable increase in the capacity of offshore wind farms, which means that in-
vestments will have to be made into transmission networks connecting the 
north of Germany with the southern federal states. It should, however, be 
noted that the capacity of the offshore wind farms is expected to correspond 
to 20–25% of the capacity of inland wind farms. In all scenarios the capacity 
of electricity storage facilities will only double. This may entail a high risk 
of electricity supply being disrupted, especially in Scenario C where the ca-
pacity of unconventional power plants is expected to be 70% higher than the 
capacity of conventional plants and the projected capacity of storage facilities 
will not make up this difference.
5.4. consequences of possible delays in the implementation  
of the Energiewende
The scale of investments into transmission networks will also vary depending 
on the scenario. According to estimates from the Federal Network Agency, in-
vestments to 2022 will total 19–22 billion euros, excluding the costs of connect-
ing offshore wind farms to the grid71. It is unclear how reliable those estimates 
will turn out to be, and whether the costs of investments will not start to grow 
should delays be encountered. Until now, electricity consumers have borne the 
greater part of network extension costs. It would not be reasonable to assume 
that the government will be able to allocate extra funds for investments, when 
faced with a prolonged crisis in the eurozone which may lead to stagnation in 
the coming decade. 
The projected costs of investments in gas pipelines also vary depending on the 
scenario of gas consumption to 2023. According to a gas pipeline network devel-
opment forecast published by operators in April 2012, the maximum scenario 
will require 1,840 km of gas pipelines to be re-built at a cost of 4.8 billion euros 
in the years 2012–2022. In the scenario with the lowest consumption, around 
700 km of pipelines will have to be upgraded at a cost of around 2.2 billion eu-
ros72. Both scenarios project that the output of conventional gas extraction in 
Germany will decrease by 64% in the years 2009–202273.
71 http://www.netzentwicklungsplan.de/sites/default/files/NEP_2012_2/Neue_Netze_fuer_
neue_Energien_Stand_August_2012.pdf, p. 40.
72 http://www.netzentwicklungsplan-gas.de/files/netzentwicklungsplan_gas_2012.pdf, p. 103.
73 http://www.netzentwicklungsplan-gas.de/files/netzentwicklungsplan_gas_2012.pdf, p. 11.
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The law on the development of transmission networks was adopted back in 
2009 in order to speed up investments. The Federal Network Agency has been 
monitoring the progress of the implementation of various projects related to 
the development of renewable energy. Its current estimates (of July 2012) indi-
cate that delays in the implementation of plans are mounting. Only 214 km of 
a planned 3,800 km of networks have been built to date, and only 35 km of new 
lines would have been put into operation in 2012. Of the 24 planned projects, 
only two have been launched, while fifteen report serious delays (between 
1 and 5 years). No underground cables have as yet been installed as part of pilot 
projects74. 
Given those facts, the risk of interruptions in the electricity supply in Germa-
ny is growing. According to the Federal Network Agency, the average duration 
of power supply interruptions per user (the SAIDI index) increased in 2011 by 
2.8% to 15.31 minutes75. This is the highest figure seen for this index in 3 years, al-
though it is still much lower than in earlier periods. Around 206,000 power sup-
ply interruptions were reported in Germany in 2011. Many experts note that the 
incidence of momentary interruptions in the power supply (below 3 minutes) 
has increased considerably since the first nuclear power plants were shut down 
– interruptions of this kind are not included in statistics and their number may 
even be twice as large as officially stated76. Tennet, one of the transmission grid 
operators, had to make 990 interventions over 306 days in 2011, and 298 times 
on 161 days the year before in order to ensure the continuity of power supplies77. 
It also had to launch a back-up oil-fired power plant in Austria, for which it came 
in for criticism from many environmental organisations. Failure to adapt the 
transmission networks to decentralised electricity generation may create prob-
lems in Germany, and an accelerated development of renewable energy may 
lead to more power supply interruptions unless the transmission grids develop 
at a matching rate. An increased incidence of interruptions, in turn, would in-
evitably destabilise transmission grids in the neighbouring countries and lead to 
electricity price increases in the European market.
74 http://www.netzausbau.de/cln_1932/DE/Netzausbau/EnLAG-Monitoring/enlag-monitor-
ing_node.html;jsessionid=E583B7AC4685032972743AE362410C86 
75 ht t p://w w w.bundesnetzagent ur.de/cln _1912/DE/Sachgebiete/ElektrizitaetGas/
Sonderthemen/SAIDIWerteStrom/SAIDIWerteStrom_node.html 
76 http://www.focus.de/immobilien/energiesparen/problem-der-energiewende-offenbar-
deutlich-mehr-stromausfaelle-in-deutschland_aid_827701.html 
77 http://www.focus.de/immobilien/energiesparen/winter-engpass-deutschland-muss-
strom-aus-oesterreich-beziehen_aid_699614.html 
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5.5. the risk of state interventions distorting the market
Accelerating the implementation of the Energiewende may lead to serious dis-
tortions in the market. The electricity generation market became increas-
ingly competitive in the 1990s and the introduction of renewable energy sub-
sidies may upset its functioning. The federal government relies on estimates 
only in setting the energy transformation targets, and the deadlines for suc-
cessive stages of the Energiewende create pressure to achieve success quickly. 
This creates a temptation to excessively subsidise the development of renew-
able energy. 
The photovoltaic sector is a good example of this kind of error: the co-financ-
ing it received resulted in the sector developing too dynamically at a rate that 
far exceeded the government’s projections. As a result, the renewable energy 
surcharges on electricity bills increased rapidly. This led to the federal gov-
ernment cutting the subsidies in the first half of 2012, but it had to settle for 
a lower scale of cuts due to opposition from the Bundesrat. Under the draft new 
law, the cap on subsidies was to be lowered to 19.5 cents/KWh (i.e. by 20.2%) for 
small installations of up to 10 kW and to 13.5 cents/KWh (by 29%) for large in-
stallations. As the Bundesrat threatened to veto the draft, the government had 
to accept less far-reaching cuts and a provision that subsidies for solar instal-
lations will be phased out only after total capacity reaches 52,000 MW instead 
of the 28,000 MW envisaged in the original draft78. The changes were moti-
vated by the need to support the solar industry which has been facing increas-
ingly strong competition from state-supported Chinese manufacturers who 
acquired several leading German companies from the sector in the preceding 
year. This situation also shows that producers of renewable energy will lobby 
for solutions that best suit them, and that time pressure may be used against 
the government. Moreover, the takeovers of solar companies demonstrate that 
it will be difficult for the German government to identify the right level of sub-
sidisation that will force companies to become competitive. 
Energy companies operating in the German market, i.e. E.ON, RWE, Vatten-
fall and EnBW, have also fallen victim to the country’s changing energy policy. 
Still in October 2010 the government promised them that their nuclear power 
plants would be allowed to continue operating to 2036, in return for which 
78 http://www.stern.de/wirtschaft/news/vermittlungsausschuss-bund-und-laender-eini-
gen-sich-bei-solarfoerderung-1846973.html 
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a nuclear fuel tax and a renewable energy tax would be imposed on the com-
panies79. The decision to withdraw from nuclear energy radically changed the 
companies’ situation and forced them to modify their strategies. For many of 
them, the Energiewende became a factor that added to their deteriorating finan-
cial standing already damaged by high indebtedness, low electricity prices and 
high gas prices. RWE’s net profits decreased by 45% to 1.8 billion euros in 2011. 
E.ON reported a loss of 2.2 billion euros in the same year, having made a profit 
of 5.9 billion euros the year before. RWE lost around 1.3 billion euros in revenue 
as a result of the Energiewende in 201180, while E.ON lost revenue of around 2.5 
billion euros81. The scale of these companies’ debts remains a problem. E.ON’s 
debt in late 2011 totalled 36.4 billion euros, while RWE owed 29.9 billion euros 
and EnBW 8.7 billion euros.
The government’s strategic U-turn forced the companies to seek greater sav-
ings, to sell their least profitable assets and to streamline employment. RWE 
plans to direct around 25% of its investments to the development of renew-
able energy to 2014 and to reduce its number of employees by 11% to 62,000. 
E.ON intends to cut its staff levels in Germany by 13% to 69,000 by 201582. The 
companies also intend to sue the government for damages of 15 billion euros83. 
E.ON and RWE have already filed cases with the Constitutional Court, while 
Vattenfall intends to seek compensation before the World Bank’s arbitration 
court where it has accused the government of violating its property rights as 
a foreign investor.
These companies’ results in 2012 should be much better, especially given the re-
duction in the price of gas they are buying from Gazprom. In view of the pro-
jected decentralisation, though, it cannot be expected that their positions in the 
unconventional energy market will become as strong as in the conventional en-
ergy market. The Energiewende will therefore undermine the dominant role of 
major European energy companies. Meanwhile, it is unclear if the companies 
from the renewable energy sector will be able to become equally strong players. 
79 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ceweekly/2011-06-29/germany-rwe-and-eon-con-
test-obligation-to-pay-nuclear-fuel-tax 
80 http://www1.wdr.de/themen/archiv/sp_energiekonzerne/rwehauptversammlung100.html 
81 http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/energiepolitik/energiekonz-
ern-eon-schreibt-milliardenverlust-11683613.html 
82 http://www1.wdr.de/themen/archiv/sp_energiekonzerne/eon242.html 
83 http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/atomausstieg-energieriesen-fordern-
15-milliarden-euro-schadensersatz-a-838527.html 
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The situation of energy companies also reveals the scale of state intervention in 
the financing of the Energiewende, which is based on subsidising renewable en-
ergy producers at the expense of consumers and companies that produce con-
ventional energy, as the bill surcharges benefit the producers of green energy 
and the exempted energy-intensive companies. Some large companies also ben-
efit from the oversupply of renewable energy, which keeps prices of electricity 
down in wholesale trade, which again creates a burden on conventional energy 
producers (4.6 billion euros as part of the “Merit-Order-Effect”). The budget, on 
the other hand, benefits from taxes on renewable electricity (1.6 billion euros) 
paid by consumers and producers. In 2011, the budget provided 0.6 billion euros 
in green energy financing, to the benefit of renewable energy producers.
Attempts made by companies to exploit loopholes in the system of exemptions 
for energy-intensive companies are another example of the potentially distort-
ing impact of state regulation on the market. Faced with such practices, the 
federal Ministry of the Environment was ultimately forced to amend the rules 
governing exemptions, as frequent cases of unduly claimed exemptions led to 
the remaining energy consumers having to pay higher surcharges. Under the 
original rules, the surcharge did not apply to companies consuming over 10 GW 
of electricity a year and those for which energy consumption represented more 
than 14% of added value. Some companies deliberately increased their electric-
ity consumption or acquired more energy-consuming machinery in order to in-
crease the proportion of electricity costs in production to over 14%. The ministry 
then decided to scrap the original system and only exempt electricity consump-
tion beyond 1 GW. Due to this much lower threshold, the number of companies 
qualifying for exemptions increased, but the value of exemptions for companies 
whose consumption only slightly exceeded 1 GW decreased considerably.
5.6. opinions of economic experts, associations and think tanks 
Germany’s academia and business circles have generally adopted a critical but 
also constructive attitude towards the Energiewende. Most reports published 
after the government’s decision to phase out nuclear energy conclude that the 
Energiewende will be feasible, provided that numerous conditions are met with 
regard to the way it is financed, its timeframe and the development of infra-
structure. 
A report published by the national academy of science and Engineering 
(Deutsche Akademie der Technikwissenschaften e.V.) in September 2012 notes 
that, first of all, the current instruments of financial support for green energy 
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(under the EEG) are inadequate, and suggests that they should be replaced by 
a quota system (which would define the quantities of energy to be produced from 
a given renewable energy source)84. It also concludes that 300–500 billion euros 
worth of investments in renewable energy will be required to 205085. According 
to the authors of the report, the entire project could be undermined if the costs 
of the Energiewende become excessive and, consequently, the public’s approval 
for it wanes. One way to avoid such excessive costs and to implement the pro-
ject effectively which the authors suggest is for the European Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme (EU ETS), an important instrument in reducing carbon emissions, 
should be strengthened. Other suggestions are that the Energiewende should be 
Europeanised, the transmission network should be developed according to the 
smart grid concept, and continuity of power supplies in the event of short in-
terruptions should be ensured. The report also argues that political decisions 
regarding the direction of the future development of the Energiewende, which 
have currently been postponed, should ultimately be taken. 
The main argument of experts from the German Energy agency (Deutsche 
Energie-Agentur GmbH – DENA) is that renewable energy production has to 
be supplemented with energy from conventional sources. This is, in their view, 
the only way to achieve the energy transformation by 2050 without compro-
mising stability. Their report demonstrates that Germany will become a net 
importer of energy in the long term (imports could reach 94 TWh in 2040 and 
as much as 134 TWh in 2050)86. At the same time, unused renewable energy and 
the absence of adequate ways to store it remain problematic. In order to carry 
out the Energiewende more effectively it will be necessary to develop transmis-
sion networks whilst ensuring that foreign electricity suppliers are ready to 
support the German energy market in case of a discontinuity of the domestic 
supply. If Germany is not able to make up for potential power shortages in this 
84 The German Renewable Energy Federation (Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie e.V.) also 
advocates this solution, referring to data which show that the renewable energy sur-
charge provided for in EEG will increase to 2.3 euro cents per kWh in 2013, compa-
red to 2.1 euro cents in 2012. Amounts collected at such a rate will be insufficient to 
effectively support the Energiewende according to BEE. Cf.: EEG-Umlage 2013: Förder-
betrag für Erneuerbare Energien steigt auf 2,3 Cent pro Kilowattstunde Strom, http://
w w w.bee-ev.de/3:1168/Meldungen/2012/EEG-Um lage-2013-Foerderbetrag-fuer- 
Erneuerbare-steigt-auf-2.3-Cent-pro-Kilowattstunde-Strom.html (27.09.2012) 
85 Cf. Die Energiewende finanzierbar gestalten Effiziente Ordnungspolitik für das Ener-
giesystem der Zukunft, Deutsche Akademie der Technikwissenschaften e.V., September 
2012, p. 4.
86 Cf. Integration der erneuerbaren Energien in den deutsch-europäischen Strommarkt, Au-
gust 2012, p. 24.
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way, it will have to maintain a large percentage of “reliable energy sources”, i.e. 
conventional power plants (which will automatically adversely affect carbon 
emissions reductions). DENA experts estimate that the existing grids will need 
to be extended by 12,900 km of new lines being constructed, and argue that 
works on infrastructure development should be brought forward87. The report 
also emphasises that electricity prices will tend to rise to 2050 (but does not 
state specific figures) as a result of the need to build new infrastructure, invest 
in renewable energy and ensure stable electricity supplies from conventional 
sources at times of lower renewable capacity. Finally, the report also argues 
that until 2050 it will not be possible to allow energy prices to be determined 
by market forces alone, as renewable energy will still need to be supported. 
The expected electricity price increases are, according to the DENA experts, 
a necessary element of the effort to reduce Germany’s dependence on external 
energy resource supplies. 
the Hamburg-based institute of international Economics (WeltWirtschafts-
Institut – HWWI) is another institution which has expressed criticism, mainly 
of the projected timeframe for the objectives of the Energiewende to be achieved. 
Its analysis presents reservations that mainly concern the feasibility of achiev-
ing savings in energy consumption by households and industry88, while reduc-
ing consumption is necessary for the timely completion of the Energiewende. 
Based on their simulations, the authors of the HWWI report demonstrate 
that electricity consumption will increase along with the expected economic 
growth and society’s continual technological advancement. The feasibility of 
substituting renewable energy for conventional energy is most at risk in the 
southern federal states of Germany where most of the nuclear power plants are 
located and infrastructure for generating electricity in conventional power 
plants are missing89. In order to fill this gap, the Institute calls for the creation 
of gas-fired power plants. HWWI also observes that wind power (especially 
offshore) has the highest potential as far as the development of green energy 
is concerned, and that in order to use this potential, transmission networks 
connecting the north with the south of Germany will need to be extended. 
HWWI experts argue that underground cables should be used for this purpose 
in order to ensure better public acceptance for infrastructure development 
(as underground cables do not distort landscapes). In order to guarantee the 
87 Cf. Ibidem, p. 6. 
88 Konsequenzen der Energiewende, Hamburgisches WeltWirtschaftsInstitut (HWWI), Juni 
2012, p. 19.
89 Cf. Ibidem, p. 23. 
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stability of electricity supplies it will also be necessary to expand electricity 
storage capacity (including through the development of smart grid technolo-
gies). Network development and electricity storage are costly processes which, 
according to the authors of the report, will lead to rising electricity prices in 
Germany. Finally, in order for the Energiewende to succeed, it will be necessary 
to create a comprehensive programme of Energiewende investments, which 
may reach a total of 335 billion euros to 2030 according to HWWI’s estimates90. 
A report on streamlining the implementation of the Energiewende, prepared by 
the German chamber of commerce and industry (Deutscher Industrie- und 
Handelskammertag e.V. – DIHK), is another important voice in the debate on 
the future directions the policy will take. DIHK experts call for better manage-
ment and the creation of a single ministry in charge of all matters related to 
the Energiewende91. The most urgent problem according to DIHK, though, con-
cerns the development of transmission networks. Work on this aspect should 
be brought forward with a view to producing a central plan of transmission 
network locations (the DIHK report covers the period up to autumn 2012) and 
increasing the numbers of staff dealing with the issuing of construction per-
mits92. The chamber also criticises the way in which the Energiewende is partly 
financed by the surcharge under the EEG and calls for reform of this instru-
ment, arguing that it mainly supports the production of solar and (offshore) 
wind power at the expense of the other sectors of the renewable energy in-
dustry. DIHK further argues that ensuring the stability of energy supplies is 
an important prerequisite of the success of the Energiewende. The authors of 
the report suggest that a governmental emergency plan in the event of power 
supply disruptions should be prepared and published in order to provide more 
stability to businesses during the course of the energy transformation. The 
DIHK report also insists that the Energiewende should become international-
ised and, in particular, that Germany’s neighbours should become involved. 
Internationalisation in this context refers to better communication between 
Germany and its partners, and more transparency in the German govern-
ment’s actions93. Finally, DIHK also sees opportunities for the Energiewende 
90 Cf. Ibidem, p. 34.
91 The Federation of German Industry is one of the several other bodies that back the idea to 
establish single oversight over the Energiewende. Cf. Energieminister, in zehn Jahren, Süd-
deutsche Zeitung, 20.04.2012, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/merkel-und-der-
atomausstieg-energieminister-in-zehn-jahren-1.1338058, (02.10.2012). 
92 Energiewende: Zehn Prioritäten für Politik und Wirtschaft, DIHK, 16.02.2012, p. 1.
93 DIHK has also published a document entitled “Energiewende europäisch denken!” in which 
it calls for the creation of an “open market in energy”, a solution whereby the European 
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to be implemented more efficiently through greater energy savings, both by 
households and by industry. In this context, it is calling for government sup-
port for energy-saving measures (including by increasing the total amount of 
lending by KfW to 1.5 billion euros, by providing for tax breaks, and by offering 
consultancy for small and medium-sized entities)94. 
the Federation of German industry (Bundesverband der Deutschen In-
dustrie e. V. – BDI) argues that the subsidies for renewable energy should be 
reduced because of the need to safeguard Germany’s social economy model 
and its competitiveness. A report published in September 2012 argues that 
the success of the Energiewende will largely depend on how the energy savings 
potential in the construction sector is utilised. The BDI therefore calls for the 
creation of a general financial and legal framework for German investments 
in this area95. The authors of the report also note that the Altmaier plan does 
not mention any initiatives concerning heat savings, as a result of which inves-
tors are facing uncertainty in this area and this potential source of energy effi-
ciency gains is not being utilised. Moreover, the BDI supports Altmaier’s pledge 
to hold broad public consultations on ways to store radioactive waste. The BDI 
also sees the need to dismantle Germany’s nuclear power plants as an oppor-
tunity to develop new technologies and export them to international markets. 
Referring to the proposals presented in the Altmaier plan, the BDI is concerned 
about a possible ungainly expansion of bureaucracy that may stifle business 
in Germany96. As regards the need to ensure the stability of power supplies, 
the BDI report points to the potential of shale gas extraction and calls for more 
openness with regard to new methods of extracting gas from unconventional 
sources, provided that environmental protection standards are met. 
Several Energiewende studies prepared by expert institutions raise the issue of 
the impact it will have on local communities. A deutsche Bank report dem-
onstrates that decisions at the federal level will be of fundamental importance 
for communities at the local level. Moreover, initiatives by municipalities and 
Union should develop a common system to support renewable energy, which should also 
aim to subsidise Europe’s green energy industry. Moreover, the authors also note that if no 
systemic solutions for the energy transformation are implemented, no new targets should 
be set for the production of renewable energy beyond 2020. Cf. Energiewende europäisch 
denken!, DIHK, 10 July 2012.
94 Cf. Energiewende: Zehn Prioritäten…, op.cit., p. 2-3.
95 Cf. BDI zum 10-Punkte-Programm für eine “Energie- und Umweltpolitik mit Ambition und 
Augenmaß”, Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V., 11. September 2012, p. 4.
96 Cf. Ibidem, p. 6-7.
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towns will play a significant role in effectively phasing out nuclear energy. 
This means new opportunities for local players, but also new challenges to 
the stability of their budgets97. In some cases the extra spending related to the 
Energiewende will force local governments to cut spending in other areas (e.g. 
in education). The Deutsche Bank experts also note the need to expand the 
transmission networks (and estimate that this will require investments worth 
25 billion euros annually to 2030)98. Reaching agreement with local communi-
ties on the routing of transmission lines from the early stages of planning will 
also be very important. The Deutsche Bank report argues that the main poten-
tial for municipalities and towns lies in energy savings. This refers primar-
ily to the modernisation of public buildings owned by the local governments 
(including schools, sports and leisure facilities), council housing and private 
homes. The main difficulty with this concept is involved with raising funds to 
finance this modernisation. However, the bank’s experts argue that – given 
the rising prices of electricity – the upgrades will turn out to be profitable in 
the long term99. Further energy savings at the local level could be achieved by 
using energy in local public transport more effectively. The report also stresses 
the need to combine public and private financing in order to optimise the im-
plementation of the Energiewende. Finally, the bank’s experts call for more co-
ordination among the different local players in order to improve the effective-
ness of the Energiewende’s implementation. 
representatives of the chemicals industry have issued a very critical joint 
statement on the Energiewende. They argue that it can only be successful if the 
economy remains profitable and the social justice system remains in place. 
They are also calling for the creation of a single, central body in the federal 
administration to manage the Energiewende project100. The statement unequiv-
ocally argues that the Energiewende cannot be achieved by replacing nuclear 
energy with renewable energy alone. In order to carry out the transformation, 
it will be necessary to modernise and expand Germany’s conventional power 
plants (both coal-fired and gas-fired) to ensure uninterrupted power supplies. 
The chemicals experts also claim that there is no big potential to increase 
97 Cf. Germany’s energy turnaround. Challenging for municipalities and municipal utilities, 
Deutsche Bank AG, September 17, 2012, p. 1. 
98 Cf. Ibidem, p. 9.
99 Cf. Ibidem, p. 10.
100 Cf. Sichere und bezahlbare Energieversorgung für die chemische Industrie in Deutschland, 
Verbandes der Chemischen Industrie (VCI), Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie, 
Energie (IG BCE) Bundesarbeitgeberverband Chemie e.V. (BAVC), September 2012, p. 3.
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energy efficiency if the country experiences dynamic economic growth101. The 
statement represents a firm stance against the increases of electricity prices 
resulting from the need to finance the Energiewende, which, if the price rises by 
1 cent/KWh, will create an additional burden of 500 million euros a year on the 
chemicals industry. Moreover, shutting down the nuclear power plants will 
lead, according to experts from the chemical industry, to rising carbon emis-
sions (as new conventional power plants will have to be put into operation) and 
thus to direct losses for the industry whose companies will have to buy more 
expensive EU emissions allowances. The conclusion of this argument is that 
the current EU climate targets should not be raised. The authors of the state-
ment are vocally demanding cuts to the financing of the Energiewende (as oth-
erwise the burden on companies will be too high) and argue that the existing 
tax reliefs for companies should be kept in place102. 
The Osnabrück-based institute of Economic structures research (Gesell-
schaft für Wirtschaftliche Strukturforschung GmbH, GWS) and the institute 
for Energy and Environmental research (Institut für Energie- und Um-
weltforschung, IFEU) from Heidelberg have both expressed a more optimis-
tic position on the Energiewende. In a joint report, researchers from the two 
institutions project that it will create new jobs and improve the standard of 
living in Germany in the long term, especially in the regional context103. The 
report argues that there is major potential in improving energy efficiency (es-
pecially in transport), which can generate savings (around 21 billion euros in 
2030) that will positively influence economic development and employment104. 
The report also underlines the particular opportunities that investments re-
lated to the Energiewende will create for municipalities and local communities. 
They will generate additional jobs in the renewable energy sector, especially in 
wind farms (the northern federal states) and in the manufacturing of subas-
semblies for renewable electricity installations (North Rhine-Westphalia and 
other federal states). The experts from Osnabrück and Heidelberg also argue 
that Germany’s energy security will improve due to a reduced dependence on 
energy resource imports and less exposure to energy price fluctuations in in-
ternational markets. Other important arguments in favour of the Energiewende 
101 Cf. Ibidem, p. 4.
102 Cf. Ibidem, p. 5.
103 Volkswirtschaftliche Effekte der Energiewende: Erneuerbare Energien und Energieeffi-
zienz, Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftliche Strukturforschung, Institut für Energie- und Um-
weltforschung Heidelberg, Osnabrück - Heidelberg 2012, p. 3.
104 Cf. Ibidem, p. 11.
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which they mentioned in their report include improved energy efficiency and 
energy savings105. Finally, the report argues that the Energiewende will become 
a model for other countries to emulate and Germany may potentially become 
a major exporter of renewable energy technologies. 
105 Cf. Ibidem, p. 18.
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iv. tHE imPact oF tHE ENERGIEWENDE on GErmany’s 
PoLiciEs in EuroPE
1. Energiewende as an opportunity for Germany
The main reasons for Germany becoming one of the world’s keenest advocates 
of renewable energy are: a desire to maintain Germany’s high position in inter-
national trade106, to protect the climate, and to escape dependence on energy 
resources. In 2007 Germany exported around 12 billion euros worth of renew-
able energy installations. Europe was the most important market for German 
companies from this sector, accounting for 45% of total green technology ex-
ports. Member states of the European Union were the destination for a deci-
sive majority of those exports. The Energiewende project as it is now being im-
plemented in Germany will contribute to a huge increase in internal demand 
for green technologies, but will presumably not stimulate mass production on 
a scale that would considerably increase profitability for manufacturers. It is 
also far from certain that EU countries, struggling with the economic crisis, 
will be able to buy more renewable energy installations. Consequently, the 
actual growth of green technology exports may be slower than in the projec-
tions of the German government, which foresee a volume in the foreign trade 
in such technologies which will reach 20 billion euros in 2020. Implementing 
the German model of energy transformation (or at least some elements of it) 
throughout the European Union would offer an opportunity to improve prof-
itability in the green technologies sector and to stimulate exports. Develop-
ing transmission networks in the EU and their cross-border connections could 
be another way to bring down the cost of the Energiewende (electricity from 
conventional power plants, necessary to support the unstable renewable en-
ergy sources whose capacity depends on weather conditions, could be import-
ed from neighbouring countries). Thus, Germany could avoid having to build 
state-of-the-art, small and effective power plants (which are in fact not eco-
nomically viable) on its own territory107. 
106 With the renewable energy sector becoming a driving force for the entire German economy. 
According to analyses from the German Ministry of Environment, the sale of green technologies 
in 2020 could reach a volume equivalent to the combined sales volumes of the automotive and 
machine-building industries, presently the most important sectors of the German economy in 
terms of exports.In the years 2004–2010 employment in the renewable energy sector increased 
by 129%.
http://www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/ee_sachstand_bf.pdf
107 http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2011A47_fis_gdn_ks.pdf
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The objective of Germany’s policy will be to build a coalition of states as broad 
as is possible, to which the German minister for the environment Peter Alt-
maier referred as the “Klub der Energiewendestaaten”108. Its members will be 
pioneer countries willing to pursue their own energy transformations. Their 
actions will demonstrate that the Energiewende creates economic opportuni-
ties and that climate protection and economic growth are not mutually exclu-
sive pursuits, but are rather two sides of the same coin. 
2. Europeanising the Energiewende
“if the energy transformation is to succeed, it has to be supported by po-
litical initiatives at the Eu level”109. This rather obvious conclusion is shared 
not only by German experts, but also by politicians, irrespective of their party 
affiliations. If a recent plan presented by the German Ministry of the Environ-
ment, party documents, and recommendations presented to the German gov-
ernment by renowned research institutes110 are analysed, it is possible to out-
line an agenda of action which the German leadership is likely to take to the EU 
forum. Germany’s initiatives will not only be geared towards facilitating the 
implementation of the Energiewende in Germany itself, but also to extending 
the German energy model to other EU countries in order to create synergies. 
The fact that the Energiewende is an increasingly important issue in the con-
texts of climate protection and energy security (also with regard to access to 
energy resources and transmission routes), it will be a challenge for Germany’s 
policy not only in Europe, but also globally.
the greatest obstacle to spreading the Energiewende in the Eu consists in 
the absence of a common Eu energy policy that would create a legal and 
institutional framework conducive to the development of green tech-
nologies and which would promote renewable energy with a view to in-
creasing its share in the energy mixes of the Eu member states. German 
experts conclude that the current situation, in which nation states decide on 
their energy policies, is anachronistic because it neither safeguards the EU’s 
108 http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2011A47_fis_gdn_ks.pdf
109 http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2011A47_fis_gdn_ks.pdf
110 Chapter based on an analysis of the following documents: 
http://www.bmu.de/strategien_und_bilanzen/publ/49041.php
http://www.cep.eu/analysen-zur-eu-politik/energie/studie-erneuerbare-energien/
http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/nc/swp-themendossiers/energiepolitik/eu-energiepoli-
tik/print/1.html 
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energy security, nor achieves reductions in carbon emissions, and energy 
policy should therefore be regulated at the level of the European Union. The 
example of Poland is often raised in this context, as a country that sticks to its 
energy mix based on coal and in this way impedes climate protection and the 
development of green technologies.
According to analysts from the German Institute for International and Secu-
rity Affairs (SWP), further development of green technologies will depend on 
whether the EU members reach agreement on three crucial energy policy is-
sues: (1) the extension and modernisation of transmission networks, (2) set-
ting common climate protection targets and introducing a binding minimum 
target for renewable energy’s share in the energy mixes of individual states; 
and (3) the creation of mechanisms to subsidise green technologies that will 
be sufficiently attractive to ensure the security of investments and thus make 
green technologies profitable. 
As has already been discussed in this report, so far the greatest problem of the 
Energiewende concerns the complexity of the development of the transmis-
sion network. A year after the decision on the Energiewende was taken, Ger-
many has managed to build only a very small proportion of the thousands of 
kilometres of projected transmission lines. The reasons for this slow progress 
include: banks being unwilling to lend to this kind of undertaking; legal dif-
ficulties related to the protracted processes of expropriating land for transmis-
sion lines; and citizen protests (while declared support for the Energiewende in 
Germany is huge, in reality the Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) and Built Abso-
lutely Nothing, Anywhere Near Anything (BANANA) attitudes prevail). 
Therefore, Germany is likely to demand or promote initiatives that will sup-
port the development and integration of networks, both within Germany and 
across borders in the EU, including through financing at the EU level. Indeed, 
on 29 June 2011 the European Commission adopted a communication “Budget 
for Europe 2020” on the next multiannual financial framework for the years 
2014–2020, in which it proposed the creation of an instrument called “Connect-
ing Europe” in order to support a full rollout of the priority energy, transport 
and IT infrastructures with a single fund worth 40 billion euros, of which 9.1 
billion euros would be earmarked for energy111. 
111 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0658:FIN:PL:PDF
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Another step towards making the Energiewende a reality could consist in 
introducing mechanisms to support green technologies at the Eu level, in-
cluding through increased spending from the EU budget. This would generate 
considerable gains for Germany as the largest exporter of these technologies. 
The objective, however, would not be to harmonise subsidies for renewable en-
ergy throughout the EU. The German subsidies are so high that their benefi-
ciaries would lose out if the scheme became “Europeanised”. Besides, Germany 
would risk being pressured to support the energy transformation processes in 
other countries. Meanwhile, MPs from the SPD have criticised the EU commis-
sioner for energy Günther Oettinger, claiming that the EU plans for the devel-
opment of energy, outlined by the European Commission in its Road Map 2050, 
place insufficient emphasis on the role of renewable energy sources. The SPD 
have called for a reorientation of energy systems in the EU towards renewable 
energy and energy efficiency, and for nuclear and coal power to be phased out 
entirely in the EU112. Such attitudes will presumably become increasingly com-
mon in Germany.
Introducing legal safeguards for the privileged position of renewable energy 
vis-à-vis, for instance, energy from nuclear power plants or unconventional 
(shale) gas would lower the production costs of both green technologies and re-
newable energy. To this end, the German government may seek for stricter bind-
ing EU safety standards for nuclear power plants to be imposed. In March 2011 
the European Commission was requested to review legislation in this field. At 
the same time (15 March) the SPD political grouping in the Bundestag filed a mo-
tion demanding amendments to the Euratom treaty: “The Treaty establishing 
the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) should be adapted to meet 
future challenges. The federal government should take measures to call an in-
ternational conference ’as soon as possible’ with a view to thoroughly reviewing 
the treaty. The special position of nuclear energy should be abolished on that oc-
casion, and the funds thus freed should be invested in the research and develop-
ment of renewable energy outside the framework of the treaty”.
With regard to shale gas, on the other hand, the German government has decid-
ed not to take any decision yet. The research of a German institute of geology has 
revealed that the country possesses huge unconventional deposits of gas. Ger-
many is aware that it will be able to use them if necessary, either by launching 
extraction, or as a bargaining chip, e.g. in price negotiations with Gazprom. 
112 http://www.euractiv.de/energie-und-klimaschutz/artikel/friedrich-kommission-unters-
chatzt-potenzial-der-erneuerbaren-energien-005889
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
77
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
03
/2
01
3
raising the binding targets for greenhouse gas emissions cuts in the Eu-
ropean Union113 – as a result of which the prices of emissions allowances would 
increase – would also help Germany achieve its energy transformation. The 
increase in the budget of the Energy and Climate Fund, which will take over 
the total revenue from Germany’s additional emissions allowances, was sup-
posed to be the single biggest new source of financing for the Energiewende. 
In March 2012, the European Parliament called on the European Commission 
to introduce mechanisms that would reverse the downward trend of prices in 
CO2 emissions trading. Under the EU climate and energy package, the EU mem-
ber states are obliged to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 20% below 
1990 levels to 2020. However, many European politicians, including in Germa-
ny, want the emission reductions target to be increased to at least 30%. The Eu-
ropean Parliament’s Environment Committee estimates that if the reductions 
target is raised from 20% to 30%, the annual cost of CO2 emissions cuts in all EU 
countries would increase to around 11 billion euros to 2020. Those lobbying for 
the higher binding targets openly admit that a large part of their motivation is 
the wish to boost the price of emissions allowances. This will improve the prof-
itability of investments in green, low-emission and efficient power plants and 
technologies, the development of which is one of the main objectives of the EU’s 
climate policy. According to the European Commission, raising the emissions 
reduction target from 20% to 30% could result in a rise in the price of emis-
sions allowances to only 30 euros. Estimates by Deutsche Bank and Barclays, 
however, show that the price could reach as much as 60–70 euros per tonne114.
A report by EnergSys suggests that the economic benefits of this policy will 
consist mainly in the development of low-emissions installations and services. 
Considering the level of Germany’s technological advancement and the fact 
that Germany is, along with China, a leader in the export of low-emissions 
technologies, the changes caused by EU climate policy will lead to an increase 
in exports of German devices and installations (wind farms, solar and biogas 
technologies). The policy will also lead to considerably higher investments in 
new, low-emissions power generation capacity in energy sectors across the EU 
member states. This also will be conducive to the development of the industry 
and the creation of jobs in Germany115.
113 http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/klimapolitik-eu-parlament-fordert-
eingriffe-in-den-emissionshandel/6332184.html
114 Quoted after: http://m.obserwatorfinansowy.pl/tematyka/biznes/ambicje-ue-w-sprawie-
co2-oznaczaja-miliardowe-wydatki-dla-polski/
115 http://www.kig.pl/files/SYNTEZA%20RAPORT%202050%20W_POLSKA.pdf
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Phasing out nuclear energy and moving to renewable energy in a revolution-
ary manner will need to be supported by conventional energy, especially gas 
power (“Without nuclear energy, Germany will be even more interested in gas 
supplies from Russia in the future116”). Therefore, the German government’s 
next steps at the EU level will most likely consist not only in attempts to miti-
gate the provisions of the third energy package in favour of the Russian mo-
nopoly Gazprom, but also in giving a green light to the construction of more 
branches of the Nord Stream gas pipeline. Indeed, on 11 May 2012 the share-
holders of Nord Stream AG decided that it will, within the next eight months, 
prepare a feasibility study on the construction of additional branches (one or 
two) of the gas pipeline. On 31 May 2012 Chancellor Merkel during a meeting 
of the Council of the Baltic States declared that she would not object to the pos-
sible construction of a third and a fourth branch of the Nord Stream pipeline, 
provided that the project is economically justified.
3. the next step: globalisation
“The German energy transformation which aims at phasing out both nucle-
ar and coal-based energy generation is of significance for the whole world. 
A global approach is important especially if we are serious about the dual task 
of protecting the climate and ensuring energy security in the long term”117. The 
Germans see making the Energiewende international as the next step after Eu-
ropeanisation to bring them closer to accomplishing the energy transforma-
tion. The objective is, firstly, to reduce the cost of transformation by sharing it 
among many countries, secondly, to find new markets and, finally, to establish 
the energy transformation as a “speciality” of German diplomacy and a trade-
mark of German foreign policy. The Germans assume that developing countries 
such as China or India, which are now facing the choice between fast growth 
and climate protection, will always opt for economic growth. Peter Altmaier, 
the German minister for the environment, is very understanding of this at-
titude, but at the same time he would like to encourage the less affluent coun-
tries to purchase German green technologies that will enable them to develop 
equally rapidly, but without harming the environment with excessive carbon 
emissions. The German leadership is convinced that the more densely popu-
116 A statement by the spokespersons for economic affairs of the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamen-
tary grouping. The EU energy commissioner Günther Oettinger also said, already after the 
German government’s decision, that gas will remain the principal fuel of growth: “More 
renewable sources also means more gas”.
117 http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2012A37_wep.pdf
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lated countries such as China or India will sooner or later have to transform 
into low-emissions economies unless they are prepared to face the unpredict-
able consequences of environmental pollution.
As with the Europeanisation of the Energiewende, the objectives behind the 
global approach include promoting the wider use of renewable energy sources, 
strengthening the market competitiveness of renewable energy technologies 
worldwide, actively supporting the phasing out of other energy sources such 
as coal and nuclear power, and investing in gas as the best transitional energy 
source to support the development of renewable energy. With such objectives 
in mind, Germany has to pursue – on a global scale – similar actions with re-
spect to renewable energy, nuclear power and coal and gas producers as the 
ones it is calling for at the EU level. The country should, then, be expected to of-
fer political support, also in international forums, to any undertakings aimed 
at phasing out nuclear and coal power, and to demand measures to facilitate 
the production and sale of renewable energy technologies and renewable elec-
tricity. It may also obstruct projects related to shale gas extraction as posing an 
environmental hazard, and will maintain good relations with the producers 
and exporters of natural gas, such as Russia. 
Germany’s diplomatic offensive will aim at promoting the idea of the Ener-
giewende as a solution to all the problems related to the depletion of natural 
resources or access to energy resources. To this end, it will use both German 
institutions (which are now engaging in “energy diplomacy”118), and interna-
tional bodies such as IRENA119. 
This text was closed on 15 October 2012 
118 http://www.fvee.de/fileadmin/publikationen/Themenhefte/th2009/th2009_03_03.pdf
119 http://www.irena.org/menu/index.aspx?mnu=Subcat&PriMenuID=13&CatID=30&SubcatID=67
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existing infrastructure planned high voltage direct
current transmission lines
newly built sections
upgrades to existing lines
planned high voltage alternating
current transmission lines
as of 1 August 2012 /
map 1. Status of transmission grid extensions in Germany
source: Netzentwicklungsplan Gas 2012, German gas pipeline operators
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existing
planned
existing
planned
existing
planowane
as of 1 April 2012 /
Gas pipelines Gas-fired power plants Coal-fired power plants
map 2. Planned extensions of conventional power plants and gas pipelines
source: Netzentwicklungsplan Gas 2012, German gas pipeline operators
